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In this research, we study efficient and lightweight Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) for ad-hoc networks through the lens of IPv6-enabled Wireless Sensor Ac-
tuator Networks. These networks consist of highly constrained devices able to
communicate wirelessly in an ad-hoc fashion, thus following the architecture of
ad-hoc networks. Current state of the art IDS in IoT and WSNs have been devel-
oped considering the architecture of conventional computer networks, and as such
they do not efficiently address the paradigm of ad-hoc networks, which is highly
relevant in emerging network paradigms, such as the Internet of Things (IoT). In
this context, the network properties of resilience and redundancy have not been
extensively studied.
In this thesis, we first identify a trade-off between the communication and en-
ergy overheads of an IDS (as captured by the number of active IDS agents in the
network) and the performance of the system in terms of successfully identifying
attacks. In order to fine-tune this trade-off, we model networks as Random Geo-
metric Graphs; these are a rigorous approach that allows us to capture underlying
structural properties of the network. We then introduce a novel IDS architec-
tural approach that consists of a central IDS agent and set of distributed IDS
agents deployed uniformly at random over the network area. These nodes are
able to efficiently detect attacks at the networking layer in a collaborative man-
ner by monitoring locally available network information provided by IoT routing
protocols, such as RPL.
The detailed experimental evaluation conducted in this research demonstrates sig-
nificant performance gains in terms of communication overhead and energy dis-
sipation while maintaining high detection rates. We also show that the perfor-
mance of our IDS in ad-hoc networks does not rely on the size of the network but
on fundamental underling network properties, such as the network topology and
the average degree of the nodes. The experiments show that our proposed IDS
architecture is resilient against frequent topology changes due to node failures.
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Introduction 2
1.1 Motivation
Internet of Things (IoT) represents a future networking paradigm that enables
computers and people, things and machines to seamlessly exchange information
and data over the Internet. It is estimated that by 2025 around 55 billion IoT
devices will be deployed and more than 15 USD trillion will be invested in IoT
in aggregate between 2017 and 2025 (Liu 2020). IoT has already been deployed
in many sectors and environments such as healthcare, manufacturing and critical
infrastructure (Li et al. 2015) and so forth. However, as promising as IoT seems
in addressing and enabling business cases that shape the modern economy, there
are observed systematic and increasing attacks on the underlying infrastructure.
The boom of IoT development and adoption seems to cause a lack of security con-
siderations. As sush, IoT infrastructures have been targeted by malicious actors,
such as Mirai botnet (Kolias et al. 2017) or the case where hackers were able to
affect the steering and braking systems of a Jeep car (Ring 2015). As such, there
is an ongoing, topical and continuously maturing research activity in security for
IoT ecosystems.
In this context, security controls can be grouped in three category types, namely
preventative, detective, and recovery. Preventative controls include authentication
and access control mechanisms, cryptography , firewalls, etc. Detection counter-
measures refer to those that are engaged during an attack, such as Intrusion De-
tection Systems. Finally recovery measures and processes focus in post-incident
management, such as security information incident management and digital foren-
sics. Due to the inherent and particular characteristics of IoT (i.e. highly con-
strained, deployed in mass numbers and their ephemeral availability), the existing
cyber security relating to conventional networks may not be applicable. One of
the main reasons is that many existing security controls may require relatively
intense computational resources and network connectivity. While such assump-
tions are guaranteed in ”traditional” networks, they are not always met in IoT
environments. Therefore the feasibility of the current security approaches needs
to be revisited.
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Particularly, in the domain of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) in IoT, a con-
siderable amount of research has been carried out concerning deployment archi-
tectures, detection strategies and algorithms. However, available IDS in IoT are
designed based on assumptions holding from “conventional” computer networks,
e.g. that each node of the network is assumed to be adequately powerful in terms
of resources (such as available energy, memory, CPU, etc.). Moreover, it is as-
sumed that connectivity is always offered and the nodes can communicate over a
reliable and high-capacity network. As such, the need of an IDS compatible with
the IoT paradigm is evident.
A wireless sensor Actuator network (WSAN) consists of a set of nodes called sen-
sors deployed over an area of interest. The devices communicate over the air with
their peers collaboratively carrying out complex tasks. WSNs are a key enabling
technology for the IoT and as such share several common characteristics. There-
fore, WSNs have provided an ideal R&D platform to study several IoT protocols
and technologies, such as the CoAP (Shelby et al. 2014), 6LoWPAN (Shelby and
Bormann 2011).
Over the past decade, Intrusion Detection Systems for WSNs and the IoT have
attracted significant research interest. IDSs can be classified based on their ar-
chitecture, namely centralised, distributed or hybrid. In centralised IDSs, the
detection algorithms are executed and performed on a designated node (host).
The underlying monitoring and detection data have to be reported to a centrally
located base station which is assumed to be powerful in terms of processing ca-
pabilities and available memory and energy. In a distributed architecture on the
other hand, each individual network node runs an IDS agent cooperatively with
other agents in the network. Finally,hybrid IDS architectures demonstrate a com-
bination of the centralised and distributed architectures in an effort to avoid the
disadvantages of each individual approach.
The current state-of-the-art on IDSs for WSN and IoT networks are still resource-
intensive, as it is primarily stemming from assumptions holding from conventional
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computer networks. Centralised IDS architectures introduce significant communi-
cation overhead to the network as the base station(or Sink) due to large numbers
of requests to and from the nodes related to IDS data collection. Distributed IDS
architectures rely on the cooperation among the sensor nodes, thus increasing the
communication load as well as energy dissipation. Lastly, hybrid IDS architectures
achieve a better control and global overview of the network, but currently avail-
able solutions also introduce a significant communication overhead that increases
proportionally to the number of network nodes. Furthermore, the resilience that
refers to the ability of the network to recover its IDS architecture and capabilities
have not been studied yet.
In this work we focus on hybrid IDS architectures but we show that by taking into
account the specifics of IoT protocols, such as the ranking mechanism of RPL, as
well as the spatial characteristics of such networks, the number of required IDS
agents in the network (and therefore the corresponding overhead) can be greatly
reduced while maintaining sufficiently high detection rates.
1.2 Aims of the Thesis
The aim of this research is to study and propose a novel IDS architecture that
takes into consideration the particular characteristics and limitations of the IoT
and Wireless Sensor Network paradigms. The proposed approach addresses the
following characteristics of IoT and WSN: their highly distributed nature; their
ad-hoc network structure; the peer-to-peer communication scheme among the de-
vices; the highly constrained nature of the devices per se in terms of resources
(computational power, available energy, limited memory). Sensor nodes in WSNs
are constrained and limited in energy resource, which is related to the manu-
facturer and sensor nodes are usually powered by two AA batteries. And also,
these sensor nodes are equipped with a few kilobytes memory and microprocessor.
Furthermore, frequent changing of the network topology due to node communica-
tion failures and potentially changing network typology. Therefore, proposed IDS
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should consider auto-configurability to cope with the dynamic nature of WSNs
and mitigate the effects of nodes failures on the efficiency of the IDS. Random Ge-
ometric Graphs (RGG) are used to design proposed IDS architecture as they are a
well-studied model and a paradigm for wireless networks, such as sensor networks.
The RGG model efficiently captures spatial characteristics of the network, and
also adhere to different network typologies (e.g. mesh and ad-hoc networks). The
WSNs are modelled as motes which in turn are represented as vertices in RGG,
whereas the communication between these motes is represented by the edges. We
study and consider a hybrid architecture of an Intrusion Detection System in
Ad-hoc and wireless networks that combines centralised and distributed detec-
tion models. This combination is envisaged to reduce the massive communication
overheads where the distributed IDS monitors a set of cluster member nodes ac-
tivities through IDS agents to detect anomalies and malicious nodes and share
information with a central IDS element. The latter is typically located at the so
called base station or sink, in an WSN architecture. Moreover, this combination
claims the advantages of both centralised and distributed detection models where
centralised model provides better control on the detection processes than the dis-
tributed model, but the latter can offer better scalability, as well as communication
overhead reduction. The distributed model is based on a small set of sensor nodes
working as a local sink and monitor the neighbour nodes in its 1-hop or cluster.
Besides, we consider a dynamic distribution and randomise the placement of the
IDS agents among the various sensor nodes.
1.2.1 Research Questions
Based on conducted literature review on Intrusion Detection System in Wireless
Sensor Networks, the following questions were derived:
• RQ1: What mechanisms/protocols/models are suitable for resource monitoring
in WSN Environments?
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• RQ2: How to reduce the communication overhead and energy consumption
induced by the IDS procedure?
• RQ3: How to implement effective and efficient real-time IDS in WSN?
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1.2.2 Research Objectives
• Objective 1: Review of the current state of the art IDS with particular em-
phasis on using IDS in WSN.
• Objective 2: Define new evaluation metrics for WSN-IDS efficiency. In partic-
ular, define the metrics that capture the trade-off between energy consump-
tion /communication overhead with detection rate of events.
• Objective 3: Define a new WSN- IDS model/ architecture that properly ad-
dresses the distributed nature of WSN.
• Objective 4 Develop efficient protocols/methods/algorithms for WSN-IDS based
on objectives 2, 3.
• Objective 5: Develop a proof-of concept WSN- IDS testbed for experimentally
evaluating objective 4.
1.3 Research Methodology
1.3.1 Literature Review
A systematic study of the literature was conducted to support the development of
a conceptual and theoretical framework suitable for this study.
The review also encompassed the current state-of-the-art on Intrusion Detection
System in Wireless Sensor Networks. The security aspects and challenges of wire-
less sensor networks, are presented along with the networking standard protocols
and a summary of the related work in the fields of intrusion detection in WSNs.
The literature review also included Wireless Sensor Networks to analyse and cap-
ture the nature of tiny devices and their security challenges. Furthermore, the
standardised wireless network protocols and their security weakness were also re-
viewed. Last but not least, the key contributions for IDS proposed for WSN and
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IoT in the current state-of-the-art was reviewed in order to identify and map the
shortcomings into research questions that were addressed throughout this research.
1.3.2 System Design
In this thesis, we introduce a hybrid IDS architecture for IoT networks that con-
sist of centralised and distributed IDS agents integrated with a novel placement
strategy. The proposed architecture can detect and mitigate the effect of node
failures. Firstly, we model a WSN with the use of Random Geometric Graphs
(RGG). The RGG model efficiently captures spatial characteristics of the network
that are closely related to network connectivity; e.g. inter-dependencies on the ex-
istence of wireless links among neighbouring nodes. Then, motivated by how IoT
networking protocols, such as RPL, manage and operate the network, we identify
the trade-offs between the communication overhead introduced by an IDS and its
detection rate of attacks such as the sinkhole attack.
The central IDS controls the entire IDS architecture and relevant data from the
distributed agents. Each network node that runs an instance of the distributed
agent, monitors and collects data on local network activity from its 1-hop neigh-
bouring nodes. This implies that not all nodes need to run the IDS agent, but
only a subset of them such that every node in the network has at least one 1-hop
neighbour operating as IDS agent. In graph theory, such a subset is defined as
a vertex cover of the corresponding RGG graph that captures the structure of
the network. This subset of the nodes that act as IDS agents is selected based
on the Vertex-cover algorithm (greedy algorithm) to find a subset of minimum
cardinality with proper placement. Moreover, we propose a method to maintain
and monitor the distributed IDS agents against node failures. The central IDS
frequently checks the set of IDS agents against node failures. In case any of the
IDS nodes fail to communicate with the central IDS, the central IDS agent will
re-run our proposed algorithm to select a new subset of the nodes to act as IDS
agents.
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1.3.3 Prototyping
A prototype was implemented in order to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency
of the aforementioned approach. We extended the-state-of the-art IDS for WSN
by Raza et al. called SVELTE Raza et al. (2013). In SVELTE, authors consider
multi-hop peer-to-peer IPv6-enabled WSNs running the 6LoWPAN stack Shelby
and Bormann (2011) on ContikiOS Dunkels et al. (2004). They develop a hybrid
IDS architecture that consists of a centralised module running on the Sink and a
distributed agent running on each individual sensor node.
In this thesis, we focus on experimentally evaluating the proposed approach on
SVELTE as a representative example of hybrid architecture IDS for ad-hoc net-
works. Particularly, we evaluate the trade-off between the potentially reduced
overhead of the IDS in successfully detection rate (due to lower number of ac-
tive IDS agents in the network) versus the reduced communication overhead and
increased energy efficiency of the network. We also evaluate the resilience and
robustness of our proposed method against random node failures.
1.3.4 Experimental Results
We integrate our method on the state of the art on IDS for WSNs and conduct
our performance evaluation via extensive emulations. We consider various net-
work densities as they are formally defined by RGG model. Experimental results
show that our proposed approach achieved high detection rates with a subset of
the nodes running as IDS agents. The energy consumption and communication
overhead introduced by the proposed IDS is reduced due to the reduction of the
number of IDS agents.
The conducted experiments show that 1) indeed the IDS detection rates remain at
very high levels (around 85%) even with a subset of the nodes as IDS agents; 2) that
the required number of IDS agents in the network in order to achieve these levels is
independent from the network population and in fact constant ; 3) that the energy
consumption and communication overhead introduced by the IDS is proportional
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to the number of IDS agents, therefore our method allows for massive energy
gains while not affecting the detection rate of the IDS. Furthermore, results show
that our proposed IDS architecture is resilient and robust against node failures.
Centralised IDS able to monitor the distributed IDS agents and reallocates a new
subset to run as IDS agents whenever node failure accrue.
This indicates that the energy efficiency and resilience of hybrid IDS architecture
for ad-hoc networks is independent to the number of nodes acting as IDS agents
and their placement. It suffices that only one of neighbouring nodes monitors and
reports relevant information to the Sink. Thus, it reduces the number of nodes
that are needed to operate as IDS agents.
1.4 Research Contributions
In this research we study efficient and lightweight Intrusion Detection Systems for
ad-hoc networks via the prism of IPv6-enabled Wireless Actuator Sensor Networks.
We first use Random Geometric Graphs (RGG) that allows to provide a formal
model of WSNs. RGG capture the spatial characteristics of WSNs as such inter-
dependencies on the existence of wireless links among neighbouring nodes. We
focus on network attacks in IoT-specific networking protocols such as sinkhole
attack in RPL. We identify the underline cause of communication overhead in
state-of-the-art and try to optimise the trade-off between energy efficiency of IDS
and detection rate. we propose a novel IDS architecture that requires only a subset
of the nodes with proper placement to efficiently operate distributed IDS agents.
We proposed a hybrid architecture IDS in Ad-hoc networks that consist of cen-
tralised and distributed IDS agents integrated with a novel placement strategy.
In our approach, the IDS architecture can be monitored against nodes failure.
Initially, we model a WSN with the use of Random Geometric Graphs (RGG).
The RGG model efficiently captures spatial characteristics of the network that
are closely related to network connectivity; e.g. inter-dependencies on the exis-
tence of wireless links among neighbouring nodes. Then, motivated by how IoT
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networking protocols, such as RPL, manage and operate the network, we identify
the trade-offs between the communication overhead introduced by an IDS and its
detection rate of attacks such as the sinkhole attack. We investigate this trade-off
via extended emulations and show that it is not necessary for all nodes to act as
IDS agents. This allows us to establish that in order to achieve a high detection
rate with minimal energy consumption overheads one needs to pick the minimum
number of nodes running the IDS agent which is achieved through a strategic
placement of these agents/nodes.
1.5 Publications Associated with this Thesis
1.5.1 Journals
• JISA Al Qurashi, M., Angelopoulos, C.M. and Katos, V., 2020. An architec-
ture for resilient intrusion detection in ad-hoc networks. Journal of Informa-
tion Security and Applications, 53, p.102-530.
1.5.2 Conferences
• ICS-SCR M. Al Qurashi, C. M. Angelopoulos, and V. Katos, “Efficient in-
trusion detection in ad-hoc networks,” in 6th International Symposium for
ICS& SCADA Cyber Security Research 2019 6, 2019, pp. 117–125.
• ICC2020 Al Qurashi, M., Angelopoulos, C.M. and Katos, V., 2020, June. An
Architecture for Resilient Intrusion Detection in IoT Networks. In ICC 2020-
2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) (pp. 1-7).
IEEE.
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1.6 Thesis Structure
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of major
attacks in WSNs, discusses IDS techniques and challenges of designing IDS for
WSNs and discusses the state-of-the-art for the proposed IDS in WSNs. This
involves Wireless Sensor Networks networking protocols which are included in
the investigation of the nature of tiny devices and their security challenges. We
consider the most important contributions in field of IDS in WSN and IoT in the
current state-of-the-art to identify the shortcomings and map them into research
questions that are addressed throughout this research.
Chapter 3 elaborates on the proposed methodology and outlines the different stages
that the research went through to fulfil the objectives of this thesis. This chap-
ter discusses the proposed network model and adopted IDS architecture based on
Random Geometric Graphs. Chapter 4 explores in greater detail and depth the
prototype of the proposed IDS architecture based on random IDS placement. The
chapter presents the performance evaluation of the proposed approach, and also
discusses the simulation results and findings. Chapter 5 presents a detailed ex-
planation of an optimisation solution that enhances the proposed IDS placements
strategy by using Random Graph optimisation algorithms. Further, the Chap-
ter presents and discusses the simulation results and findings of proposed method
that design to mitigate the effect of nodes failures. Finally the conclusion and
recommendations for future research are presented in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the current state-of-the-art IDS in WSNs. We present the
security aspects and challenges of WSNs, networking standard protocols and a
summary of the related work in the field of intrusion detection in WSNs.
This literature investigates constrained-networks and the nature of tiny devices
and their security challenges. Further, it reviews standardised wireless network
protocols and their security aspects, followed by a review of the state-of-the-art
contributions of IDS in WSN and IoT to identify that shortcomings and open
issues that will be addressed throughout this research.
Figure 2.1: Literature Review Landscape
2.2 Wireless Networks
2.2.1 WSN Architecture
Typical WSNs are composed of a number of sensor nodes (SNs) which are dis-
tributed in a wide area, and a gateway. SNs consist of a sensing unit, a processing
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unit, a transceiver and a power unit. Each node has the ability to sense its sur-
rounding environment and perform simple computations. Sensor nodes communi-
cate wirelessly with their peers further to direct communication to based station
(Khan 2014). Usually, data in WSNs is transmitting towards a base station. The
packets may have to be forwarded over multi-hop routing since the radio chip is
not powerful enough to communicate directly to base station when the node is
too distant. Moreover, the base stations (access points) have much more compu-
tational, energy and commutation resources. They work as a gateway between
sensor nodes and the end user since they forward data from a WSN to a host
server, as shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Typical Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
Sensor and based stations use protocol stack similar to the OSI model, but it con-
sists of five layers: application layer, transport layer, network layer, data link layer
and the physical layer(Akyildiz et al. 2006). This protocol stack combines power
and routing awareness, integrates data with networking protocols, communicates
power efficiently through the wireless medium and promotes cooperative sensor
node efforts (Chen et al. 2009) (Ghosal and Halder 2013). The physical layer is
responsible for frequency selection, carrier frequency generation, signal detection
and signal processing and data encryption. The data link layer is responsible for
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Figure 2.3: Common sensor node Architecture (Singh et al. 2014)
the multiplexing of data streams, data frame detection, medium access flow con-
trol and error control. It ensures reliable point-to-point and point-to-multipoint
connections in a communication network. The network layer routes the data given
by the transport layer. It is responsible for specifying the assignment of addresses
and how packets are forwarded. The transport layer helps to preserve the flow of
data if the sensor networks application requires it. This layer is especially needed
when the system is planned to be accessed through the Internet or other external
networks (Kolias et al. 2016),(Pathan 2016),(Lavric and Popa 2017).
2.2.2 Energy consumption in WSN Nodes
Energy consumption is a critical issue in WSNs because of the constrained energy
resource, which is related to the manufacturer and sensor nodes are usually pow-
ered by two AA batteries. The sensor node in a WSN consists of several units:
microprocessor, transceiver, sensor and power supply modules as shown in Fig-
ure 2.3 (Biswas et al. 2018),(Adu-Manu et al. 2018),(Zhou et al. 2011). These
components work to gather to collect sensing data about the WSN environment
and transmit these data over the base station (e.g.to the cloud, database, another
system, process, etc.) (Seah et al. 2009)(Luo et al. 2014).
The energy consumption of WSN nodes can be summarised as follows:
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• Sensing Unit. The energy consumption of a sensing unit is due to its opera-
tions, such as analogue-to-digital and signal modulation in both burst and
periodic modes. For instance, the energy consumption in periodic mode can
be expressed as follows:
Esensor = Eon−oƒ ƒ + Eoƒ ƒ−on + Esensor−rn (2.1)
where Eon−oƒ ƒ is the energy consumption of the closing sensor operation,
Eoƒ ƒ−on is the energy consumption of the opening sensor operation and
Esensor−rn is the energy consumption of the sensing operation that is equal
to the working voltage multiplied by the current of sensors and the time
interval of the sensing operation (Abo-Zahhad et al. 2015).
• Processing Unit. The core activities of the processing unit are sensor con-
trolling, protocol communication and data processing. Basically, this unit
supports three operation states (sleep, idle, run). The processor energy
consumption, represented as, Ecp is the sum of the state energy consump-
tion Ecp−stte and the state-transition energy consumption, Ecp−chnge
where  = 1,2, ..m is the processor operation state and m is the number
of the processor state, j = 1,2, ..n, is the type of state transition and n is
the number of the state-transition (Tomic´ and McCann 2017)(Pantazis et al.
2013).
Ecp = Ecp−stte + Ecp−chnge
=
m∑
=1
Pcp−stt()Tcp−stte() +
n∑
=1
Pcp−stt(j)Tcp−stte(j)
(2.2)
where Pcp−stte() is the power of state  that can be found from the
reference manual and Tcp−stte() is the time interval in state , which is
a statistical variable. Pcp−chnge(j) is the frequency of state transition j
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and Tcp−chnge(j) is the energy consumption of one-time state transition
j (Tomic´ and McCann 2017).
• Communication Unit. The communication unit includes the base-band (near-
zero frequency) and radio frequency, which are responsible for sending and
receiving node data. The transceiver usually has several operation states:
T, R,Oƒ ƒ , de, Seep nd Cer Chne Assessment (CCA/ED)
(Zhou et al. 2011). The transceiver energy consumption can be calculated
by summing the state energy consumption and state-transition energy con-
sumption. Energy state consumption can be calculated from the expression
below (Wei et al. 2017)(Pantazis et al. 2013)(Khanmirza and Yazdani 2016):
Etrns−stte = ETX + ERX + Ede + Eseep + ECCA (2.3)
Energy consumption in data processing is much lower compared to the data com-
munication. For instance, the energy cost of transmitting 1 KB a distance of 100
m is approximately the same as that for executing three million instructions us-
ing a 100 million instructions per second (MIPS)/W processor(Dhand and Tyagi
2016).
2.2.3 WSN security
Security Challenges: According to our literature review, we can summarise
security challenges of WSNs as presented below:
• Resource constraint Security solutions in WSNs add an expensive communi-
cation overhead and energy consumption.
• The vulnerabilities of the communication medium The wireless commu-
nication between WSN nodes can be intercepted easily.
• Sensor nodes are vulnerable to physical attacks Since wireless sensors are
physically accessible, an adversary may gain full access to nodes and obtain
sensitive information or even physically damage the nodes.
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• Dynamic changing of the topology The topology of WSNs usually change
quickly due to adding or nodes failures.
Security requirement: In a WSN, data are transmitted wirelessly over the air,
which is an unreliable and unsecure communication medium for critical and con-
fidential data. An adversary can intercept the communication of a WSN and
may listen to or alter sensitive data. Security prevention solutions such as cryp-
tography should cooperate with other security solutions to enhance the security
of WSNs, and to ensure the security of wireless (Chen et al. 2009),(Grover and
Sharma 2016),(Mendez et al. 2017),(Burhanuddin et al. 2018). In this research,
we focus on network layer security threats. Based on the literature review, the
basic security goals for WSNs were derived presented follows:
• Confidentiality: Data in WSNs travel wirelessly over an unreliable communi-
cation medium, therefore, adversaries can easily intercept the communication
listening to sensitive and critical data. Data confidentiality in WSN forbids
adversary to obtain data which is one of the crucial security requirements in
WSNs.
• Integrity: Since adversaries can easily intercept the communication in WSNs,
they are able to alter data and break into its integrity during communication.
Date integrity helps to prevent data to be altered or modified by an adversary
or unauthorised node.
• Availability: In WSNs, denial-of-service DoS attacks as an example can take
place at any protocol layer of WSN causing an excessive communication
overhead that drains constrained resources of WSN. As a consequence, DoS
attacks effect the availability and the operation of many critical applications
like those in the military and healthcare sectors. Availability ensures that
services and information are available to an authorised user whenever it is
required.
• Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation helps to identify and isolate compromised
nodes. Further, non-repudiation ensure that any communication between
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nodes within wireless networks is undeniable, and also it prevents malicious
nodes from hide their activities.
• Authentication: In WSNs, data are transmitted over untrusted public wireless
environment, thus malicious nodes might acquire some sensitive data. Each
node must ensure the identity of peer nodes with which it communicates.
2.2.4 Security Attack in WSNs
Wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to a number of types of attacks due to their
limited resources, and unreliable transmission medium(Khan 2014),(Deogirikar
and Vidhate 2017),(Chelli 2015). WSNs attacks can be classified into five classes
based on the protocol layer an attack can occur, as presented below:
• Physical Layer Attacks Jamming: Is the primary attack in physical layer,
where a malicious node attempts to send a high energy signal toward sensor
nodes causing interference with the radio frequencies of the nodes. This at-
tack can eliminate the WSN services resulting into denial of service (DoS)(Can
and Sahingoz 2015),(Zhu et al. 2017).
Tampering: Since sensor nodes are physically accessible, adversaries could
access a node by physical means and extract stored sensitive data such as
encryption/decryption keys(Raju and Parwekar 2016).
• Data link Layer Attacks Collision: When two or more nodes attempt to
transmit simultaneously on the same frequency, the data portion will be
changed due to packet collision. As consequence, the packet will be rejected
due to checksum failures (Yadav and Kumar 2016)(Miranda et al. 2014).
Exhaustion: In this attack the adversary consumes all energy resources of
the targeted node and disturbs the media access control protocol (MAC),
by occupying the channel by sending and receiving unnecessary data (Yadav
and Kumar 2016).
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Sybil Attack: A malicious node in this attack assumes the identities of many,
legitimate sensors through MAC spoofing. A Sybil attack can be detrimental
to the services offered by a sensor network (Benzarti et al. 2017).
• Network layer attacks Spoofing, Replaying Routing: This is a direct attack
against routing protocols. A malicious node can modify routing information
of the entire or part of a WSN to disrupt the network traffic and flow. This
kind of attack can create new routing paths, generate false error messages
or shortening or extending source routes (Sinha et al. 2017).
Selective Forwarding: The aim of selective forwarding attacks is to interrupt
the communication process, where a malicious node performs forwarding of
the received packets to a neighbouring node in a selective manner. Selective
forwarding is considerably more difficult to detect, when compared to an ap-
proach of a malicious node systematically dropping all packets (Butun et al.
2014). Wormhole attacks: In a wormhole attack, there is one, two or more
malicious nodes are placed on a network at different locations; these nodes
create tunnels and forward and replay packets through these tunnels. The
aim of the attacker is to deceive the sender and receiver nodes by convincing
them that they are situated at a distance of one or two hops, instead of the
actual distance which is actually higher (Amish and Vaghela 2016),(Patel
et al. 2015).
Sinkhole/Blackhole attack: In a Sinkhole attack a malicious node advertises
itself as the best route to the sink node. A malicious node would listen to
route requests and then it would falsely advertise that it has the shortest
path to the base station. When a malicious node succeeds in attracting
sufficient network traffic, it can start dropping all or selected packets or even
change the content of some of the packets(Cervantes et al. 2015),(Deogirikar
and Vidhate 2017),(Abdelshafy and King 2016),(Jain and Tokekar 2015).
Hello flood attack: Many routing protocols in WSN require nodes to an-
nounce their state through a hello broadcast message. In this attack, a
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malicious node would broadcast random packets to cause congesting to the
channel (Alanazi et al. 2015),(Bouabdellah et al. 2018).
Acknowledgement Spoofing: Each node in wireless sensor network uses a
static routing information table, and it updates this routing table by send-
ing or receiving Hello and ACK messages. In this kind of attack, a mali-
cious node would capture a packet from its neighbouring nodes and spoof
an acknowledgment by providing false information to the nodes(Xiao et al.
2016),(Gai et al. 2017),(Taylor and Johnson 2015).
Homing attack: In a homing attack, adversaries analyse network traffic in
order to deduce the geographic location of a critical node such as cluster head
nodes or the neighbour nodes of the sink node in order to physically disable
these critical nodes and eventually shut down the entire network. The aim
of this kind of attack is to block the traffic to the sink node, also to provide
better environment for launching other attacks (Butun et al. 2014)(Ghosal
and Halder 2013).
• Transport Layer Attacks Flooding: In this attack a malicious node would
continuously send connection requests until the WSN resources drained out
(Benzarti et al. 2017). De-synchronization: Attackers try to disturb and
swindle existing connections by repeatedly sending fake packets which con-
tain control flags or sequence numbers causing de-synchronization between
the two ends (Liu et al. 2005)(Hossain et al. 2015),(Ioannou and Vassiliou
2016).
• Application Layer Attacks Overwhelm attack: Adversaries in this attack
try to overwhelm the entire wireless sensor network by sending appropriate
stimuli to cause the sensors to send huge amounts of traffic to the base
station. As a consequence, this attack drains out the network resources
(Nawir et al. 2016),(Kasinathan et al. 2013).
Path-based DoS attack: Malicious nodes in this attack are placed along the
path between a source and the base station and inject fake packets that
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drain out the network resources. Therefore, the pathways to base station
will be exhausted and denied for the legitimate nodes (Sonar and Upadhyay
2014),(Andrea et al. 2015)(Gope et al. 2016),(Goyal et al. 2010).
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Layers Attacks Attacks Impact Countermeasure
Physical Layer Jamming Radio interference
Channel hopping
and Blacklisting
Tempering
Physically access nodes and
extract sensitive information
Protection
and Changing of key
Collision Link layer encryption
Exhausting Consumes network resources
Data Link Layer Sybil
Impersonate other
legitimate identities
Change the key regularly
Spoofed routing
Effective encryption and
authentication
selective forwarding
Network Layer Wormholes Multi path routing
Sinkhole
Sybil
Exploit weakness
in routing protocol
Secure routing protocol
Hello Flood
Hierarchal and
geographic routing protocol
Acknowledgment Spoofing Effective encyption
Homing
Flooding
Transport Layer De synchronization
Exploit weakness
in communication protocols
Client puzzles
Application layer Overwhelming Drains out network resources Isolate malicious node
Table 2.1: Characteristic of Security attacks in WSNs and their Countermea-
sure
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2.3 WSN Network and Communication Model
In order to understand the security requirements of the communication and stan-
dard protocols, we considered the protocol stack under IETF (Internet Engineer-
ing Task Force) with respect to network layer standard communication proto-
cols and routing protocols. In this section, we present the network layer stan-
dard communication protocols and the security analysis of these protocols.
Figure 2.4: Communication Standards and Protocols
2.3.1 WSN Standards Communication Protocols
1. RPL(Routing Protocol for Low-power and lossy network) is a distance-
vector dynamic routing protocol that supports link layer technologies (e.g.
IEEE 802.15.4, Wireless Heart, etc.) and manages the communication from
wireless nodes to the base station (sink node). RPL has two main com-
ponents: wireless sensor node and border router which is responsible for
the translation of packets for Internet. Furthermore, RPL organizes the
network topology as Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that can be directed
to one or more sink node as Destination Oriented DAG (DODAG) where
Border Router is the root (Sink node). The best path is computed usu-
ally based on the number of hops as routing metric and node energy con-
sumption or the expected number of transmissions (ETX). RPL protocol can
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support MP2P (Multipoint-to-Point), P2MP (Point-to-Multipoint) and P2P
(Point-to-Point) topologies. The information exchange maintenance of the
topology is supported by RPL control messages (e.g. DODAG Information
Object)(Silva et al. 2018) (Zhao et al. 2017),(Porambage et al. 2015). RPL
organize the network topology as Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that can be
directed to one or more sink node as Destination Oriented DAG (DODAG)
Figure 2.5. RPL use Internet Control Message protocol v6 (ICMPv6) that
Figure 2.5: DOG and DODAG Topology (Sutaria 2014)
enable nodes to send messages through wireless networks. It has three con-
trol massages as presented below (Al-Fuqaha et al. 2015)(Tomic´ and McCann
2017),(Yang et al. 2015),(Farooq et al. 2015),(Kharrufa et al. 2017):
• DODAG Information Object (DIO) : DIO is a multicast message
provides information about the network for other nodes to discover
and join the network as shown in figure above (Shaffer et al. 2015).
• DODAG Information Selection (DIS): DIS is a message used by node
to broadcast a request for DIO when it has not received within specific
time.
• Destination Advertisement Solicitation (DOA): DAO is unicast from
node to DODAG root to confirm that the sending node has accepted
the DIO to join the network. This message is routed upward across the
DODAG (Accettura et al. 2011).
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There are several attacks that had exposed new security issues and vul-
nerabilities in WSNs protocols (e.g. IEEE 802.15.4, 6LoWPAN, RPL). For
instance, the network layer attacks exploit the weaknesses in routing mech-
anism in PRL protocol. There are number of attacks protocol that exploit
the weakness in RPL by altering control massages in WSNs (Granjal et al.
2015) (Chamudeeswari and Sumathi 2017).
2. 6LoWPAN (IPv6 for Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Network)is a net-
work protocol that enables constrained wireless nodes to connect to the in-
ternet. In essence, this protocol modifies IPv6, as the standard version of the
latter is impractical for deployment in a constrained wireless communication
network. In particular, 6LoWPAN is enabling the efficient use of IPv6 where
it fragments IPv6 into small parts, the minimum size of IPv6 packet is 1280
bytes and IEEE 802.15.4 supports 127 bytes packet. 6LoWPAN protocol
supports multi-hop communication where the nodes can forward packets to
each other, however it faces the problems of routing solution that supports
different communication patterns and deals with limited resources, low-data
rates, link failures, and nodes mobility which led to design RPL (Rahman
and Shah 2016)(Raghunandan and Lakshmi 2011),(Mayzaud et al. 2014),(Pu
2018).
Figure 2.6: 6LoWPAN compressed header (Ishaq et al. 2013)
3. IEEE 802.15.4 IEEE 802.15.4 is a standard radio technology and low-cost
protocol for PHY and MAC layer. It has been used widely in many wireless
applications due to its low-cost and low power consumption. It has three
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different modulation techniques as presented below (Molisch et al. 2004),(Liu
et al. 2017):
• IEEE 802.15.4 for PHY layer: It supports 11 low-frequency band (868/915
MHZ) channels and 16 high-frequency ISM (Industrial, Scientific and
Medical) radio band (2.4 GHZ).
• IEEE 802.15.4 for MAC layer: It manages the access to physical chan-
nels and time slots, frame detection and node association. Further, it
uses CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoid-
ance) method
• IEEE 802.15.4.e for MAC layer: It is revised version of IEEE 802.15.4
for MAC layer that supports multi-hop communications by using (TSMP)
Time Synchronized Mesh Protocol.
4. CTP (Collection Tree Protocol) CTP is a tree-based routing protocol de-
signed for low traffic rates providing many-to-one or one to-many commu-
nication. CTP is a best-effort protocol that does not guarantee reliable
delivery. Furthermore, it addresses routes to tree where roots are generated
by using the expected transmissions (ETX). A single root is allowed which
has ETX of 0, while a node’s ETX is a sum of the ETX of its parent and
the ETX of its link to the parent (Tomic´ and McCann 2017)(Granjal et al.
2015).
5. BCP (Backpressure Collection Protocol) is a low cost routing protocol that
designed based on backpressure routing where there is no explicit path com-
putation between source and destination. The routing paths are chosen
based on the link backpressure weight that is a function of the queue and
link state information. When the forwarding queue is non-empty, the node
computes weights for all of its neighbours (Jiao et al. 2016).
6. CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol) CoAP is a standard protocol
supports application-layer communication and it has been developed for
web transfer within the IoT. It is similar to the Hypertext Transfer Proto-
col (HTTP), CoAP depends on the representational state transfer (REST)
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architecture which is embedded in User Datagram Protocol (UDP) for trans-
actions in the 6LoWPAN environments. CoAP uses very limited resources
which reduced complexity and provides the same services as HTTP (Tomic´
and McCann 2017).
2.3.2 WSN Routing Protocols
The network layer in WSNs is responsible for the communication in the network.
Furthermore, the communication model is integrated into the routing protocols
with additional requirements and challenges compared to the conventional net-
work. In particular, the distributed nature, dynamic topology and constrained
energy source introduce new requirement that must be considered in design-
ing routing protocols. There are several routing mechanisms have been devel-
oped and proposed to overcome the challenging of designing routing protocol in
WSNs. These mechanisms have considered the constraint and other requirements
of WSNs. Therefore, an efficient routing protocol will offer significant reductions
of energy consumption that prolong the life time of WSNs. The routing proto-
cols can be classified into four main schemes: Communication, Network Structure,
Topology Based and Reliable Routing Schemes (Pantazis et al. 2013),(Zhou et al.
2011),(Al-Fuqaha et al. 2015), (Manjeshwar and Agrawal 2001).
1. Communication Scheme. This scheme adapts the communication model
into a routing protocol as the main operation of the protocol in order to
route packets in the network. The protocols in this scheme deliver more
data for a given energy amount and can perform close to the theoretical
optimum point-to-point and broadcast networks in terms of dissemination
rate and energy usage(Ancillotti et al. 2013). However, the Communication
Scheme protocols do not have high delivery rates and do not guarantee the
data delivery. The protocols in communication scheme can be classified as
follows:
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• Query-Based Protocols The destination nodes of this type of protocols
propagate a query for data (e.g. sensing task) from a node through
the network, and a node having the data send back this data to that
initiated the query(Singh et al. 2009).
• Negotiation-Based Protocols These protocols use negotiation to elim-
inate redundant transmission in the network by exchanging a series of
negotiation messages before real data transmission(Siddiqui et al. 2006).
2. Network Structure Scheme Depending on whether the nodes have uni-
form or distinct and different roles, the structure of a network can be clas-
sified into flat and hierarchical structure. Nodes route packets and are con-
nected based on the network structure they implement. The underlying
protocols in this category can be classified as follows:
• Flat Protocols In Flat protocols all the nodes in the network are equal
which minimize the overhead to maintain the infrastructure between
communicating nodes (Zhang et al. 2014).
• Hierarchical protocols The hierarchical routing protocols impose a struc-
ture on the network in order to achieve energy efficiency, stability and
scalability. Protocols in this class organize the network nodes into clus-
ters where each cluster has cluster head node which is nominated based
on higher remaining energy. As a consequence, clustering protocols
achieve a significant reduction of energy consumption and prolong life-
time of the network (Liu 2015).
3. Topology based SchemeThe protocols in this scheme require every node
in the network to maintain the topology information. The topology base
protocols can be classified as follows:
•Location-based protocols these protocols use the position information
to find a path from source to destination that has minimum energy
consumption(Camp et al. 2002).
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•Mobile Agent-based protocols The mobile agent protocols have a mo-
bile agent that travels among the nodes in the network to perform a
task based on the environment conditions (Rath et al. 2019).
4. Reliable Routing ProtocolsReliable Routing protocols provide the re-
silience to route failures by achieving load balancing or satisfy certain QoS
metrics such as energy consumption and bandwidth. However, the scheme
may add more overhead on the nodes since nodes need to maintain the rout-
ing table and QoS metrics at every node. The protocols in this scheme can
be classified as follows:
• Multipath –Based Protocols: They are more resilient in case of rout-
ing failure(Singh 2018).
• QoS-Based Protocols: QoS-Based protocols balance between energy con-
sumption and data quality when the sink node requests sensory data
from any node in the network (Yessad et al. 2018).
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Protocol Classification Advantages Drawbacks
DREAM Network Topology-Based Efficient packet transition Consumes the network bandwidth
SPEED Reliable Routing Performs well in end to end communication Low performance in heavy traffic networks
LEACH Network Structure -based Compatible with ad-hoc, distributed,low energy consumption Not applicable for large networks
CBMPR Reliable Routing Simplicity, limited Interference Path joining
TEEN Network Structure -based Handles sudden changes in the network Energy Consumption and overhead in large networks
ZRP Network Structure -based Low routing traffic Expensive delay Message
ROAM Reliable Routing Avoid sending unnecessary search packets, Required to keep sending Hello
GDSTR Reliable Routing Able to find the shortest routes High energy consumption and communication overhead
SELAR Reliable Routing Select the node with highest energy level Does not perform well when node keep change its location
RPL Reliable Routing Low Energy Consumption Does not support multicast traffic
SPIN Communication Minimal cost when stat up Low delivery rate
ACQUIRE Communication Ideal for complex queries Flooding
LEACH-C Network Structure -based Less Energy consumption Overhead
PEGASIS Network Structure -based Reduces The transmission distance No consideration for of the sink node
ELCH Network Structure -based Minimize the transmission energy consumption Cannot handle clusters exceed certain amount
Table 2.2: Comparison of Network layer routing protocols
2.3.3 Eenrgy Efficiency Performance Evalaution of Com-
munication Protocols
Energy consumption is among the most critical issues in WSNs, as these can be
found in deployments that do not have connectivity to power supplies and may
require batteries as energy sources. Therefore, the existing communication proto-
cols are designed based on residual energy and transmission energy consumption.
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In WSNs, there are three major activity catagories that affect the level of energy
consumption: sensing, data processing and the communication of sensor nodes
which is the major factor of the energy consumption. Consequently, we consider
the energy consumption factors in WSNs with particular emphasis on communica-
tion factor. There are some metrics that can be used to evaluate the performance
and energy efficiency of communication routing protocols in WSNs (Tomic´ and
McCann 2017) (Le et al. 2013) (Ahmed et al. 2015). These metrics can be sum-
marized as follows:
1. Energy per Packet. It refers to the amount of energy that packet spends
from a source to a destination.
2. Network lifetime. In many cases this metric denotes the time when the
first node or certain section of the network’s nodes is dead.
3. Average Energy Dissipated. This metric is related to the average dissi-
pation of energy per node over time in the network as it performs functions
such as transmitting, receiving, sensing and aggregation of data.
4. Low Energy Consumption. An efficient protocol should consider the
remaining energy of the nodes and selects routes that prolong the network’s
lifetime.
5. Total Number of Nodes Alive. This metric is related to network lifetime
and it shows the area coverage of the network by alive nodes over time.
6. Average Packet Delay. This metric is calculated as the average one-way
latency that is observed between the transmission and reception of a data
packet at the sink.
7. Packet Delivery Ratio. It is the ratio of successfully delivered packets to
destination over the total number of packets sent from source sensors.
8. Time until the First Node Dies. This metric indicates the duration until
the first node runs out of energy.
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9. Energy Spent per Round. This metric is related to the total amount of
energy spent in routing messages in a round.
10. Packet Size. The size of a packet determines the time that a transmission
will last.
11. Distance. The distance between the sender and receiver that can affect the
required power to send and receive packets. The routing protocols can select
the shortest paths between nodes in order to reduce energy consumption.
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2.3.4 Attacks and Security Analysis of Network Layer Com-
munication Protocols
1. 6LoWPAN protocol is vulnerable to a number threats since there are no
indigenous security mechanisms defined in context of this protocol. For in-
stance, through a fragmentation attack one can change the packet fragment
fields in the fragmentation chain. This is feasible due to the lack of node au-
thentication when joining the network. An unauthorised node can perform
the attack on the receiver buffer since the receiver waits for all fragments for
reassembly. Moreover, 6LoWPAN does not secure end-to-end communica-
tion between IP sensor nodes and the Internet which makes them vulnerable
to spoofing and man in the middle attacks. The IPsec (Internet protocol
Security) specification which enables the authentication and encryption of
each IP packet at the network layer may enhance the security as prevention
solution (Pongle and Chavan 2015b)(Wallgren et al. 2013)(Pantazis et al.
2013).
2. RPL is a Routing protocol for LLNs low power and lossy networks in net-
work layer (e.g. RPL, AODV). It may overcome the routing challenges in
constrained networks since it has been designed based on resources con-
straints awareness of LLNs. Nevertheless, a wide majority of WSNs and
IoT attacks can occur in network layers due to routing protocols vulnerabil-
ities. Malicious and adversarial nodes would typically exploit the protocols
weaknesses in order to affect communication, routing and networking in gen-
eral. RPL is designed for the multipoint to point communication with three
basic security modes namely: unsecured mode, preinstalled mode and au-
thenticated mode. None of RPL security mode has been implemented which
makes RPL protocol prone to number of internal network layer attacks. The
attacks on RPL are summarised below: (Kamble et al. 2017)(Weekly and
Pister 2012) (Al-Fuqaha et al. 2015) (Airehrour et al. 2016)
• Selective Forwarding Attack: This attack occurs when malicious or
compromised nodes selectively forward packets that may lead to DoS
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(denial of services) attack. In RPL protocol, this attack disrupts the
routing path by forwarding all RPL control messages and drops the rest
of the traffic (Le et al. 2011)(Stehlik et al. 2016).
• Sinkhole Attack: Sinkhole attack is an insider attack were an attacker
can compromise a node inside the network and launch an attack. The
malicious node in this attack advertises a beneficial path in order to
attract its neighbour nodes to route the traffic through it based on the
routing metric that used in the underlying routing protocol. This kind
of attack does not disrupt the network operation but it breaks into the
data integrity and confidentiality in the network (Rehman et al. 2016)
(Deogirikar and Vidhate 2017).
Protocol Attacks Attack Characteristic Security Solution
LoWPAN Fragmentation attack Changes the packet fragment fields
Authentication attack Man in middle attack Exploit security weaknesses in end-to-end communication Network access control
Spoofing attack IPsec
Bot analysis module
RPL Selective forwarding attack Forwarding all RPL control messages and drops the rest of the traffic Heartbeat
Advertise beneficial path in order to attract its neighbor Failover/Rank authentication
Sinkhole Attack Impersonates other nodes identities
Distributed hash tables
Sybil Attack Broadcasting Hello message with strong routing metrics
Hello Flooding Attack Creating tunnel between the two or more malicious nodes
Separate keys for network segments
Wormhole Attack
Attracts some child node to be parents of other nodes
Rank Attack
Uses DIS (DODAG Information Solicitation) to generate more control DIS messages Limit the rate of tickle timer resets
DIS Attack
CTP Blackhole Attack Advertise beneficial path to attract network’s traffic to pass through malicious node Secure CTP
Selective forwarding attack Alter some packet header and data
False routes Attacks Kinesis
Header/data Modification
BCP Sinkhole Advertise beneficial path in order to attract its neighbor VAR trust model
Data alteration Selectively drop some packets
Selective forwarding attack Virtual trust queuing
Table 2.3: Attacks on Network layer protocols
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Figure 2.7: Sinkhole Attack (Kaur and Singh 2016)
• Sybil Attack: In this attack, a malicious node impersonates several iden-
tities of the same physical node. It should be noted that this type attack
is not evaluated yet on the RPL routing protocol (Jan et al. 2015) to
the best of our knowledge.
• Hello Flooding Attack: According to this attack, a malicious node in-
troduces itself as neighbor node to many nodes by broadcasting Hello
message with strong routing metrics when joining the network. In RPL
protocol, the DIO message is the equivalent Hello message that is used
to advertise information about DODAG (Moudni et al. 2016).
• Wormhole Attack: RPL can be vulnerable to the wormhole attack. This
kind of attack occurs by creating a tunnel between the two or more mali-
cious nodes and forward and replay packets through these tunnels(Khan
et al. 2013).
• Rank Attack: Rank value in RPL increases from root to leaves nodes.
An attacker attracts some child node to be parents of other nodes in
order to attract network traffic going toward the root (Base Station)
or by advertising false rank value which may lead to establish a non-
optimal route(Le et al. 2013).
• DIS Attack: This attack uses DIS (DODAG Information Solicitation) to
generate more control DIS messages. Malicious nodes periodically send
the DIS messages to its neighbors. As a result, the receiver nodes upon
receiving DIS message reset the DIO timer assuming something went
wrong with the topology around. In multicast DIS attacks, the evalua-
tion showed the highest increase in end to end delays which generates
Literature Review 38
more control overheads and is energy exhausting (Pongle and Chavan
2015b)(Kamble et al. 2017).
3. CTP routing protocol was designed to achieve minimum power consump-
tion, but the security measures was not considered. As a consequence, CTP
is vulnerable to routing attacks such as sinkhole, wormhole, and so forth.
Malicious nodes can alter CTP operation rules such as ETX which could
lead to presence of loops and inconsistencies within the network. Therefore,
the number of beacon frames will be increased which in turn will cause more
communication overheads and increased energy consumption (Elyengui et al.
2015).
4. BCP routing protocol does not adopt any security mechanism that makes
BCP vulnerable to network layer security threats. A malicious node can per-
form selective forward attacks by dropping some received packets or altering
massage header or data which disturb the network operation. Moreover,
a malicious node may exploit BCP operating rules by advertising a wrong
queue size and link quality to attract or prevent any incoming traffic (Pan-
tazis et al. 2013).
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2.4 Intrusion Detection System in WSNs
In conventional networks there is a limited concern about the computational com-
plexity and network resources required in the deployment of the security defence
mechanisms. On the contrary, WSNs have constrained resources, such as limited
computational power on the sensor side, low energy life time and hardware con-
straints. As such, designing a suitable and effective IDS in a WSN environment is
a challenging task.
Figure 2.8: Basic components of an Intrusion Detection System
2.4.1 Detection technique
With regards to IDS approaches, there are four main categories used in the detec-
tion of attacks:
Signature based (S-IDS): With this type of detection method, the patterns
or signatures of known attacks are stored in a database, and the detection pro-
cess matches the incoming events against these signatures (Shamshirband et al.
2014)(Liao et al. 2013)(Ma et al. 2015).
Anomaly based (A-IDS): Anomaly based methods can potentially detect zero
day attacks or unknown attacks, as they attempt to capture normal, legitimate
behaviour and alert the administrator when activity outside the “normal” enve-
lope is observed (Kushwaha et al. 2017)(Van et al. 2017).
Specification protocol analysis (SPA): The specification in SPA focuses on
analysing and tracing the protocol states and their transitions in order to detect
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whether there is any deviation from expected protocol behaviour. This is done, for
example, by pairing request messages with replies (Patel et al. 2013) (Abduvaliyev
et al. 2013)(Song et al. 2016).
Hybrid IDS approaches: Hybrid techniques combine both anomaly-based and
signature-based approaches. Hybrid mechanisms contain two detection models,
signature based to detect known attacks and anomaly based for detecting un-
known attacks (Guerroumi et al. 2015)(Pan et al. 2015).
The anomaly detection approach is more flexible than rule-based detection, and
could potentially detect zero-day attacks and new kinds of attacks. However, it
may raise a higher number of false positive alarms because of legitimate network
traffic may change slightly or usual behaviour has not been analysed completely.
Pros Cons
SIDS Simple and effective methods to detect known attack. Cannot detect unknown attacks.
Detailed contextual analysis Hard to keep signatures up to date.
Time consuming to maintain the knowledge
AIDS Effective to detect new and unknown attacks Weak profile accuracy due to observed events
Less dependent on OS being constantly changed.
Facilitates detections privilege abuse. Unavailable during rebuilding of behaviour profiles.
Difficult to trigger alerts in right time.
Stateful protocol analysis Trace the protocol stats Resource consuming to protocol state tracing and examination.
(specification-based) Distinguish unexpected sequences of commands Unable to inspect attacks looking like benign protocol behaviour.
Might incompatible to dedicated Oss or Aps.
Hybrid Exploit the benefits of both techniques and detect unknown attack as well as known attack and detect unknown attack as well as known attack
Table 2.4: Comparison of IDSs Detection Technique
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2.4.2 Machine Learning in IoT Security
Machine learning (ML) algorithms have been widely used in a variety of real-world
applications because of their ability to learn and solve problems from experience
without direct human interaction. Machine learning begins the learning process
with observations, direct experience or instructions to look for specific patterns in
datasets to make a decision without human interference. Particularly, in intrusion
detection learning algorithms, the main function is to distinguish and classify nor-
mal behaviour and detect any system deviation. The performance improvement
of learning algorithms can be achieved by improving the accuracy of the classifica-
tion and learning experience from which the algorithms collect the data of system
normal behaviour (Al-Garadi et al. 2020).
Machine learning algorithms can be classified into three main categories: Super-
vised, unsupervised and reinforcement learning (RL). Supervised learning algo-
rithms learn from existing or training data and can apply what has been learned
to new data using labelled dataset. Training data consist of inputs labelled with
correct output. Learning algorithm search for pattern in training data that corre-
late with the correct outputs. The learning algorithm can also compare its output
to modify the model accordingly. After training, a supervised learning algorithm
is applied to new data to determine which label the new data will be classified
based on prior training data (Jordan and Mitchell 2015). On the other hand, un-
supervised learning algorithms have originated from supervised learning methods
for learning representations, learn important representations of the input without
labelled and training data. These learning algorithms aim to analyse unlabelled
data and to classify the input data into distinctive groups by identifying com-
monalities in the data and the similarity between them. The last but not least,
reinforcement learning (RL) are trained by interacting with an environment. RL
aims to understand an environment and discover the best approaches to a given
agent in different environments. An RL agent learns from the consequences of its
actions, rather than from being explicitly trained. Usually, it selects its actions
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based on its past experiences and new choices (Hastie et al. 2009),(Schmidhuber
2015).
2.4.2.1 Common Machine Learning algorithms in IoT Security and
IDSs
This section discusses the common ML algorithms that have been used in IoT
security applications and IDSs.
- Decision Trees (DTs) methods form a tree hierarchy of branches to classify sam-
ples according to their feature. Each path from the root to a leaf represent a
classification decision, and each internal node in a tree represents a feature. Tree
branches in decision tree represent an outcome of the test and denote a value that
the node can have in a sample to be classified. The samples are classified starting
at the origin vertex and with respect to their feature values. The feature that
is able to optimally split the training samples is considered as origin node of the
tree. Authors in (Alharbi et al. 2017), used DT-based classifier in their proposed
intrusion detection to analyse network traffic to detect suspicious traffic behaviour
of DDoS. Nevertheless, DT-based supervised machine learning methods require
large storage due to the nature of DT data (Al-Garadi et al. 2020).
- Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are used supervised machine learning as clas-
sification algorithms. SVMs create a splitting hyperplane in the data attributes
between classes, where the distance between the hyperplane and the most adja-
cent sample points of each class is maximised (Tong and Koller 2001). SVMs
ML algorithms have been widely used in intrusion detection algorithms, such as
the proposed attack detection in a smart grid (Ozay et al. 2015) . This research
showed that the proposed detection algorithm based on SVM is effective in de-
tecting known and unknown attacks, and also has better performance comparing
with traditional methods used for attack detection in smart grids.
- Beyesian theorem-based ML algorithms describe the probability of an event based
on previous related information of the incident. For instance, Naive Bayes (NB)
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classifier is used in a supervised classifier that uses the Bayesian theorem to fore-
cast the probability that can be used by intrusion detection to classify the traffic
as normal or abnormal. The network feature such as connection duration, con-
nection protocol (e.g. TCP) and connection status flag can be used for traffic
classification(Mukherjee and Sharma 2012),Jordan and Mitchell (2015).
- k-Nearest neighbour (KNN) is a simple supervised machine learning algorithm
that often uses the Euclidean distance to solve both classification and regression
problems. KNN has been used in statistical estimation and pattern as a non-
parametric technique. KNN algorithm use feature similarity to predict the values
of new datapoints, where the new data point will be assigned a value based on how
closely it matches the points in the training set (Al-Garadi et al. 2020). Authors
in (Li et al. 2018), proposed a classifier based on KNN that have been used for
network intrusion detection and anomaly detection in IoT environment. Further-
more, authors in (Sicari et al. 2015), proposed intrusion detection to classify nodes
as normal or abnormal in WSN. The proposed system showed that the detection
algorithm achieved a high level of accuracy comparing to other ML algorithms.
- K-Means clustering is an unsupervised ML algorithm. This method is designed to
discover clusters in the data, and k refers to the number of clusters to be generated
by the algorithm. The aim of this algorithm is to find groups in the data, with the
number of groups represented by the variable K. The algorithm works iteratively
by assigning each data point to one of K groups based on the features that are
provided. Data points are clustered based on feature similarity. The inputs of
the algorithm are the number of clusters (k) and dataset, which contains a set of
features for each sample in the dataset (Al-Garadi et al. 2020).
- Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is a computational model in machine learning
that emulate the human mind’s ability to identify patterns and interpret percep-
tual information. It is the foundation of artificial intelligence (AI) that is able
to solve problems that would prove impossible or difficult by human or statistical
standards. ANNs have self-learning capabilities that enable them to produce bet-
ter results as more data becomes available. ANNs are arranged in multiple layers,
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where the information enters the neural network through the input layer, which
is the primary outermost layer. Authors in (Hodo et al. 2016) proposed a threat
analysis based on multi-level perceptron ANN for IoT. Their approach focuses on
the classification of normal and threat patterns on an IoT Network. Their ex-
perimental results showed that the proposed detection method successfully detect
various DDoS and DoS attacks with a high level accuracy.
- Convolutional neural network (CNN) is a class of deep neural network that was
introduced to reduce the data parameters in ANN. The parameters are reduced
by utilising three concepts: sparse interaction, parameter sharing and equivariant
representation. The training time complexity of a CNN is reduced due to the
reduction of the connections between layers. (Goodfellow et al. 2016). CNN has
been applied to the training approaches in DL, and also allows for the automatic
learning of features from raw data with high performance. However, it has a high
computational cost, therefore; implementing CNN in resource-constrained devices
is challenging (Al-Garadi et al. 2020).
- Recurrent neural network (RNN) is another class of neural networks that allow
previous outputs to be used as inputs, thus the output of the neural network de-
pends on the present and past inputs. RNNs have achieved good performance
in many applications with sequential data , such as machine translation (Pas-
canu et al. 2013).Authors in (Torres et al. 2016), use RNN in analysing network
traffic behaviour to detect malicious behaviour, their approach achieved accurate
malicious behaviour detection.
2.4.3 Network Traffic Source
With regards to the source of traffic or data that IDSs use to monitor the resources
of a computerised networked system, IDSs can be categorised into three groups
(Arias et al. 2015)(Liao et al. 2013)(Hu et al. 2018)(Igbe et al. 2016):
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Network based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS): NIDS can detect ma-
licious activity by monitoring network traffic, capture packets and analyse entire
packets payload.
Host based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS): A host based intrusion
detection system (HIDS) analyses information collected from a particular host
such as file systems, network events and system calls.
Hybrid Intrusion Detection System: It consists of both HIDS and NIDS com-
ponents typically involving a central agent who checks the entire network traffic
while a mobile agent checks a system through log file inspection.
Strength/pros Limitation/cons
HIDS Identify intrusion by monitoring hosts file system and system calls events of network. Needs to be installed on each machine.
Can only monitor attacks on the host where it is deployed
NIDS Hard to detect encrypted traffic.
Identify intrusion by monitoring network traffic. Difficult to detect intrusions in virtual network.
Can monitors deferent types of system at the sometime. Difficult to detect internal attack.
Only need to place underlying network.
Hybrid-IDS Uses characteristics of NIDS and HIDS, thus has the strength of both of them. Require high communication computational cost
Table 2.5: Comparison of IDSs traffic source
2.4.4 Detection Frequency
Following the current state of the literature, there are in general three conventions
on the detection of frequency that influence the communications and energy con-
sumption overhead.
Continuous: the Intrusion Detection System monitors the network continuously
and work without interruption(Arias et al. 2015).
Periodical: the detection algorithm is executed in certain and specified peri-
ods of time (Butun et al. 2014).
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Event-based: in this case, the detection algorithms are activated only when a
particular critical event has occurred (Abduvaliyev et al. 2013) (Butun et al. 2014).
Continuous monitoring in terms of energy consumption is most expensive as it
comes with a long execution duration. From an energy consumption perspective,
periodical and event-based techniques consume lower energy than continuous mon-
itoring since they are activated in specific points in time. Nevertheless, they may
not be efficient in critical applications (Liao et al. 2013).
2.4.5 Architecture and placement strategy
IDSs can be classified according to their architecture and computation location
to Centralised, Distributed (Cooperative or Cluster-based) and hybrid (consist
of Centralised and Distributed architecture) IDS. First, a centralised system re-
quires all relevant monitoring and detection information to be reported to the base
station. The detection algorithm is executed only in base station which is more
powerful in terms of processing power and memory and is thus supports complex
detection method. Centralised systems have an overview of the entire network
that provides the ability to detect suspicious nodes and activities in the network.
However, the communication to the base station is increased due to the huge
amount of reported traffic (Abduvaliyev et al. 2013) (Butun et al. 2014) (Benzarti
et al. 2017)(Sharma and Gupta 2015)(Duhan and Khandnor 2016)(Kenkre et al.
2015)(Sabahi and Movaghar 2008). In distributed or cooperative systems, each
node is equipped with an IDS agent, which cooperates with other agents and par-
ticipates in the detection of the overall network. When a node detects an intrusion
with incomplete evidence, it may cooperate with the detection procedure further,
and, it can alert an entire the network about an intrusion. Distributed and coop-
erative techniques are suitable for designing lightweight IDS for WSNs; however,
an node agent IDS cannot apply a powerful analysis algorithm since wireless sen-
sor nodes are constrained in resources and performance. Finally, there is hybrid
IDS, which is an architecture that combines centralised and distributed systems.
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In these systems cluster head nodes or nodes equipped with an IDS agent, clus-
ter head nodes (CHs) monitor their member node and cooperate with the base
station as part of the intrusion detection mechanism. This technique inherits the
advantages of both centralised and distributed architectures, which may reduce
the overhead on WSN resource constraints (Abduvaliyev et al. 2013) (Liao et al.
2013)(Patel et al. 2010)(Peddabachigari et al. 2007)(Arrington et al. 2016)(Sabahi
and Movaghar 2008).
2.4.6 Combination of IDS with prevention system in WSNs
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) are more proactive types of software systems
aiming to prevent the progress of an attack by responding to security incidents
through actions such as firewall policy and Access Control List (ACL) updates
and so forth. The combination of both IDS and IPS introduced a new security
solution that is defined as Intrusion Detection and Prevention System. IDPSs
are mainly focused on identifying, detecting and reporting a security incident to
administrators to rapidly respond to the incident and mitigate the impact caused
by the incident and update the security measures. IDSP can also monitor file
transfers and identify suspicious ones. IDPS in wireless networks monitor net-
work wireless communications against malicious activities, events characteristic
of a malware attack, behaviour deviation, and performs mitigating actions. Par-
ticularly, a wireless IDPS monitors wireless network traffic and analyses wireless
networking protocols against malicious activities. Wireless IDPSs can enhance
the security of Wireless Networks. However, they cannot detect certain type of
attacks (e.g. offline traffic possessing) and the problem refers to the deployment of
sensors due to the lack of stander architecture. Furthermore, IDPSs require mas-
sive communication overheads in constraint networks and impractical with weak
security prevention measures.
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2.4.7 Challenges of IDS in WSNs
Designing an Intrusion Detection in WSNs is challenging for several reasons. First
of all, the communication in WSNs is multi-hop, the topology of the network is
dynamic topology and very often not known. Moreover, nodes are constrained in
CPU, memory, bandwidth and energy. Due to constraints resource, traditional
techniques used in conventional networks are impractical in WSNs.
In addition, transmitting data is very costly in terms of energy for the sensor
nodes and thus should be minimised. More specifically, the challenges in intrusion
detection systems for wireless sensor networks can be summarised as follows:
1. Sensor nodes have limited power resources, processing capability, memory
and radio range.
2. DoS attacks can be more successful than other attacks since WSNs commu-
nicate over open environment (Coppolino et al. 2013).
3. Logging on a WSN node level may be limited due to the nodes’ low storage
capabilities (Patel et al. 2013).
4. Limited bandwidth requires more effort in data transmission. As conse-
quence, data transmission may consume a significant amount of power (Liao
et al. 2013).
5. Frequent changing of the topology, due to adding and failure node.
The challenges altogether require Intrusion Detection systems specifically tailored
to wireless sensor networks.
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2.5 Related Work and Current State-of-the-art
IDS in WSNs
We have grouped the most contributed IDSs in field of Wireless Sensor Network
based on the centralised, distributed and hybrid architecture. In centralised IDSs,
all relevant monitoring and detection information has to be reported to the base
station. Detection algorithm is executed only in base station where based station
is more powerful in terms of possessor and memory and able to perform complex
detection methods. On the other hand, in distributed systems each node equipped
with an IDS agent cooperates with other agents and participates in the detection
of the overall network. When a node detects an intrusion with incomplete evi-
dence it may cooperate with components through global detection procedures. If
a node detects an intrusion, it can alert entire the network regarding that intru-
sion. Finally hybrid IDSs combine Centralised and Distributed in order to exploit
the advantages of these two architectures.
2.5.1 Centralised Architecture IDSs
Moon et al. proposed a detection method for WSNs in terms of energy con-
sumption and aggregate IDS with intrusion prevention systems. In this approach,
symmetric encryption and one–way hash functions have been used to construct the
routing path between BSs and nodes. Their results showed that the total amount
of required energy was reduced in some cases. However, the use of symmetric
key increases the computation overheads. Further, the initial construction phase
requires the BS and every node in the network communicate with each other using
the topology and route construction message (TRC message) and the neighbour
information response message (NIR message) which increases the communication
overhead all over the network (Moon et al. 2014).
Midi et al. proposed an intrusion detection system for IoT named Kalis. Kalis
is placed at the border router to collect features of the network and use these to
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dynamically configure appropriate detection techniques. The authors claim that
this approach can be applied and extended to new protocols as it is a protocol
independent method being based on features(Midi et al. 2017).
Jun et al. proposed a centralised intrusion detection system for IoT. They intro-
duced Complex Event-Processing (CEP) techniques to monitor network packets
that is placed at the router border. Their approach is a specification-based IDS
relies on stored rules in Rules Pattern Repository using SQL. The experiment
result reveals that their approach had increased the computation overheads and
consumed less memory compared to traditional IDS (Jun and Chi 2014).
2.5.2 Distributed Architecture IDSs
Coppolino et al. proposed a distributed anomaly detection method to detect
anomaly events in WSNs. They have used both signature and anomaly based de-
tection techniques and their framework is composed of a central agent and num-
ber of local agents. The central agent performs data mining detection techniques
whereas the local agents deploy lighter anomaly detection techniques. The em-
pirical results showed that this method had low detection accuracy and high false
positive rate. This approach was designed and evaluated based on QoS aspects,
whereas it inherited assumptions from conventional networks; the performance
of the proposed IDS was measured in terms of false positive rate, false negative
rate, and accuracy. Moreover, it does not consider the constrained resources and
nature of WSN since it use complex anomaly detection algorithm that required
maintaining the profile of the network behaviour (Coppolino et al. 2013).
Kumarage et al. proposed a distributed anomaly detection method for WSNs that
used unsupervised data partitioning adaptive with fuzzy c-means clustering that
distributes the sensor nodes into clusters. This approach classifies the data and
identifies anomalies through maximizing distributed in-network processing in a
hierarchical architecture as a distributed cluster. This proposed method was eval-
uated by both synthetic and real data. The results showed this distributed method
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achieved a high detection accuracy and less communication overheads comparing
with existing centralized algorithms. However, it still required communication
overheads since each node is in charge of local observation and cooperation with
neighbour nodes for local anomaly detection (Kumarage et al. 2013a).
Maleh et al. proposed a lightweight IDS for WSNs that combined anomaly based
detection by employing support vector machine algorithms augmented by signa-
ture rules. In addition, this approach was applied to a cluster-based topology to
reduce communication costs leading to network lifetime improvements. The sim-
ulation result showed that the detection of abnormal events has a high rate and
lower false alarms. However, this approach combines anomaly detection (SVM)
with signature based algorithm requiring more computation overhead and huge
storage space to store attacks signatures. Furthermore, this approach requires all
node members (local agents) to cooperate with cluster heads (global agent) in
detection mechanism which increases the local communication overhead (Maleh
et al. 2015).
Zhenge et al. proposed an approach based on Specification Protocol Analysis that
exploits location information of a sensor node to verify the legitimacy of sensors
and detect clone attacks. Furthermore, they proposed a distributed clone detec-
tion protocol (ERCD) protocol where neighbour nodes observe a suspect node and
report potential divergent behaviour. The simulation results showed that this ap-
proach yielded a very high accuracy in detecting clone attacks and relatively low
energy consumption comparing with existing approaches. Nevertheless, this ap-
proach is limited to clone attack and it may increase the communication overhead
since the nodes required cooperating with neighbour nodes in detection mechanism
(Zheng et al. 2016).
Cervantes et al. proposed a distributed Intrusion Detection System on 6LoWPAN
called (INTI) for IoT. INTI is a distributed IDS combines trust and reputation
concepts in which each node monitors exchange packet with neighbour nodes. In
their approach, nodes are classified into leader, association and member nodes
following hierarchical or cluster based network structure, also the node’s category
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can be changed over the time due attack occurrence or network reconfiguration.
When a node detects an attack, a broadcast alert is sent to other nodes in the
networks. The performance and effectiveness of this approach were not presented
(Cervantes et al. 2015).
Xie et al. introduced an Intrusion Detection method that uses hyper grid k-nearest
neighbour(KNN) based anomaly detection for WSNs. This approach considered
the distribution of computation load evenly all over the network where it dis-
tributed the nodes into clusters. Each node in the cluster monitors its local traffic
and sends the summary to its cluster head (CH). Then, the cluster head collects
all local summaries and aggregate from its member nodes in the cluster to broad-
casts collected summaries as a global normal behaviour of the network. Member
nodes will perform the detection mechanism locally based on global normal profile.
The experiments with the real WSN data set have revealed the proposed detec-
tion method is robust for WSNs comparing with other existing approach where
it features low computation and communication overhead. This approach may
reduce the global communication overhead; however it may drain out the cluster
head nodes resources due to the massive local communication overhead between
member nodes and their cluster heads (Xie et al. 2012).
Wang et al. had proposed a cluster-based detection approach for WSNs that
consists of three different IDS agents for sink node, cluster head and sensor node.
Each agent is designed based on the capability of node that is designed for in
order to exploit the advantages of distributing the detection efforts over all nodes.
Additionally, they used hybrid detection technique that combine rule-based with
back- propagation network (BPN) to detect anomalies. The simulation results
showed that the proposed approach achieved low resource consumption in some
cases; however the proposed BPN anomaly detection technique is not accurate
enough to minimize the false positive alarm. This approach consists of three
different IDS agents that increase the complexity of detection mechanism and
increase the communication overhead (Wang et al. 2011).
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Xie et al. proposed a segment-based anomaly detection method to detect anoma-
lies in WSNs. This algorithm has combined the Distributed Segment-Based and
Kullback–Leibler divergence measures and distributed the sensor nodes in clusters
and each cluster has a cluster head node. The algorithm is executed separately
by each cluster head node and main nodes. This method was evaluated using a
real-world data set and the result had revealed a high performance and low commu-
nication costs. However, this proposed detection method is limited to hierarchical
network and may be applied for flat network with additional requirements. It also
assumes static architecture that does not consider frequent dynamic changes of
WSN (Xie et al. 2017).
Oh et al. proposed a distributed signature-based detection system for IoT. In
their approach, each single node in charge of monitoring the network traffic ex-
tracts the packet payloads in order to reduce unnecessary matching to reduce the
computational overhead. The adopted detection algorithm in each node matches
against conventional attacks signatures in Snort. Their detection approach may
detect attacks faster than other algorithms, but only detects known conventional
attacks (Oh et al. 2014).
2.5.3 Hybrid Architecture IDSs
Raza et al. introduced an IDS for WSN that follows a hybrid architecture. Their
solution focuses on routing attacks and consists of a central IDS module (running
computationally intensive processes) that runs on the Sink node and a lightweight
distributed agent that is deployed on sensor motes. The proposed IDS has three
main modules: a central module called mapper, a lightweight intrusion detection
module, and a firewall. The proposed solution shows a good performance in small
networks, but it introduces a massive communication overhead in larger networks.
This is mainly due to the fact that the lightweight agent is deployed on every
single sensor mote of the network, thus leading to bottleneck phenomena to emerge
around the Sink as the diameter of the network increases (Raza et al. 2013).
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Shareenivas et al. proposed a hybrid IDS for IoT by extending (Raza et al. 2013).
They extended the detection module of SVELTE by using ETX(Expected Trans-
missions) metric with the detection process. Moreover, they proposed detection
methods with geographical information to detect malicious nodes that attempt
to attack ETX based networks. Their evaluation experiment revealed that their
approach achieved better detection rates. However, they evaluated their approach
in small networks with few nodes (Shreenivas et al. 2017).
Ponomarchuk et al. proposed a lightweight detection method to detect malicious
packets in WSN based on the traffic analysis. Their detection technique was based
on monitoring of packet reception rate (PRR) and inter-arrival time (IAT) of pack-
ets. Moreover, this method analyses the neighbouring nodes’ behaviour using the
thresholding technique against packet reception rate and inter-arrival time. The
simulation result showed that this approach yielded low resource consumption and
better accuracy in comparison with other algorithms. Nevertheless, monitoring of
incoming traffic from nodes at their one-hop neighbours along the path towards
the BS may require more communication overheads and the detection metrics used
in the approach are limited to a few threats (Coppolino et al. 2013).
Le et al. proposed a specification-based intrusion detection system for IoT to
detect attacks on RPL-based networks. Their approach is based on hybrid and
partly distributed architecture that divides the network into clusters where each
cluster has a cluster head. The distributed IDS agents are placed on the cluster
heads to monitor member nodes within their cluster. And then, each cluster head
reports all relevant detection information to the central IDS that is placed on
base station. The simulation results revealed that their approach achieved high
detection rate and low overhead. However, this proposed IDS is limited to cluster
based networks (Le et al. 2016).
Pongle et al. proposed a hybrid intrusion detection system for IoT that consist of
central and distributed IDS agents. The centralised IDS agent was placed on the
border router and the distributed IDS agent is equipped with other network nodes.
The distributed IDS agents are in charge of monitoring their neighbour nodes and
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report to the central IDs in the sink node. The simulation result showed that
their approach achieved low energy consumption and high detection rate, but still
limited to small size networks. (Pongle and Chavan 2015a).
.
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Proposed approach Detection technique Architecture Security Attacks Limitations/ Drawbacks
Moon et al. Signature Based centralized specific
Energy consumption,
Very low detection rate
Coppolino et al.
Anomaly
Signature Based
distributed specific complex detection algorithm
Maleh et. Al
Anomaly based
distributed general Communication overhead,
Raza et al. Anomaly based Hybrid Routing attack Communication overhead
Kumarage et. al Anomaly based distributed general Communication overhead
Xie et. Al Anomaly based Hybrid specific Communication overhead within local cluster
Zhenge et. Al Specification protocol analysis distributed specific Cooperation between nodes increased Energy consumption
Xie et. al Anomaly based distributed general Limited to hierarchical networks
Wang et. Al Anomaly /Signature Based distributed specific Communication overhead
Ponomarchuk et. A Traffic analysis distributed general Communication overhead
Jun et al. Specification-based centralized general computation overhead, Communication overhead
le at al. Specification-based Hybrid Routing attack Limited to cluster based networks
Shreenivas et al Hybrid Hybrid Routing attack Communication overhead
Ponoglo et al. Anomaly based Hybrid Routing attack Limited to small size networks.
Cervantes et al Hybrid distributed Routing attack No details provided
Oh et al. Signature Based distributed conventional attacks Only detect known attacks
Midi et. al Hybrid centralised DoS attack Energy consumption,
Table 2.6: Comparison of State-of-the-art IDSs
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2.6 Evalution of the IDS
The proposed IDS can be evaluated through a simulation, an actual implemen-
tation environment (testbed) or a combination of both simulation and implemen-
tation in a real-world setting. Simulation is helpful for effectively analysing large
networks, different topologies and investigate scalability issues. However, imple-
mentation allows better assessment of the actual behaviour in the real world.
The current state of the art in IDSs, WSNs, have been evaluated using simula-
tion, implementation or a combination of both. Nevertheless, there is no universal
agreement nor standard evolution metrics to evaluate the proposed IDSs. IDSs can
be evaluated from two different aspects: effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness
metrics measure the detection accuracy and the ability of a system to distinguish
between normal and malicious activity while efficiency focuses on the resources
that systems use and consume (e.g. available energy, CPU, etc). The proposed
IDSs in IoT and WSNs in the published literature are evaluated differently. The
majority of the proposed systems in the state of the art focused on measuring
the accuracy and effectiveness of the IDSs in terms of detection accuracy using
different datasets with limited consideration to the efficiency metrices. Moreover,
available works in the literature on IoT and WSAN IDS limit their simulation
studies in networks with small populations which is not sufficient to evaluate the
efficiency. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the better IDS. In table 2.6, we
present a comparison of the current state-of-the-art IDS designed for WSNs with
respect to their evaluation metrics.
2.7 Summary and Findings
During the last decade, a number of IDSs have been proposed in WSN and IoT. In
the literature review, we focused on the most important contributions in area of
IDS in WSNs and IoT. The current-state-of-the-art IDSs in WSNs and the IoT can
be classified based on their architectures and placement strategies as centralised,
distrusted and hybrid architecture. This classification helps in investigating the
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open issues and shortcomings in the current sate of the art since the security
solution’s architecture is an essential factor in constrained networks.
The majority of the proposed IDSs in WSNs are decentralised (distributed) so-
lutions, in which the sensor nodes are responsible for detecting anomalies. They
require cooperation with other nodes in wireless networks networks in the detec-
tion procedure, which increases the communication overhead between sensor nodes
in WSNs. (Kumarage et al. 2013b) proposed a distributed anomaly IDS for WSNs.
Their results showed this distributed method achieved less communication over-
head when compared with existing centralised algorithms, but the communication
overhead is still required since each node is in charge of local observation and
cooperation with neighbour nodes for local anomaly detection. As a consequence,
the distributed (decentralised) IDS architecture consumes the constraint resources
in sensor nodes. (Xie et al. 2017) proposed a distributed IDS for WSNs, in which
the IDS agents are placed on the cluster heads of the network. This approach is
limited to hierarchical WSNs, as the detection algorithm is executed separately
in each cluster.Due to the absent of a central IDS agent in this approach, each
cluster works as an individual network and is responsible for monitoring its own
traffic.
The centralised IDSs are typically placed on border routers (base stations), where
they are more powerful and rich in resources (e.g. constant energy, powerful CPU,
etc). The centralised approaches provide better control of the detection proce-
dure, but they require intensive communication with other nodes to monitor node
activities and manage the detection procedure. (Moon et al. 2014) proposed a cen-
tralised detection method for WSNs that considered energy consummation. Their
centralised architecture requires BS and every node in the network to communi-
cate with each other, which increases the communication overhead throughout the
network the network.
(Coppolino et al. 2013) introduced a hybrid IDS that combines decentralised and
centralised intrusion detection architectures for WSNs. This method consists of
local agents that are installed in each wireless sensor node and a central detection
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agent located in the base station. The hybrid architecture may distribute the
computation overheads among all the sensor nodes and base station; however, it
introduces substantial communication overheads between the nodes and the base
station that drains constrained resources in WSNs. (Le et al. 2016) proposed
an IDS for the IoT based on hybrid and partly distributed architectures that
divides the network into clusters, where each cluster has a cluster head. The
distributed IDS agents are placed on the cluster heads to monitor member nodes
within their cluster. Their approach showed low communication overheads and
energy consumption, but it is limited to cluster-based networks. The fact is that
the real-world IoT devices and Wireless sensors are not strict in the placement and
may be placed randomly in the area of interest. Thus, these approaches target
specific network typologies. The proper design of IDS architecture for the IoT
and WSNs should consider the nature of constraint device and real-world node
placement.
The current state-of-the-art IDSs in WSNs reveal resource-intensive IDS solutions
that overburden the constrained resources. It relies on cooperation between sensor
nodes, which increases the communication overhead and energy consumption since
the limited bandwidth in sensor nodes requires more effort in data transmission.
According to (Zhou et al. 2011), the energy cost of transmitting 1 KB a distance of
100 m is approximately the same as that for executing three million instructions
using a 100 (MIPS)/W processor. Thus, communication overheads is a critical
factor that plays a pivotal role in the energy consumption of WNSs and the IoT.
Moreover, the existing research has focused on IDS in WSNs the nature of WSN
constraints (computational power, available energy, limited memory), but the fre-
quent changing of the network topology due to node or communication failures has
not yet been studied. As such, IDS in a dynamic network with a potentially chang-
ing network typology is a very challenging task. Accordingly, IDSs should consider
account auto-configurability to cope with the dynamicity of WSNs. Furthermore,
the current state-of-the-art IDSs in WSNs have been evaluated differently due the
lack of universal agreement regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of evaluation
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metrics. For instance, (Coppolino et al. 2013) proposed a distributed anomaly de-
tection method to detect anomalous events in WSNs, which was evaluated based
on Quality of Service (QoS) with inherited assumptions from conventional wired
networks. Most existing IDS for WSNs do not provide comprehensive analyses of
real-world implementation and simulations, which makes analysing the effective-
ness of an IDS mechanism a difficult task.
The shortcomings and open issues of the current state of the art in related work
on designing IDS for WSN can be summarised as follows:
1. Existing IDS in WSNs and the IoT are still resource-intensive and, the con-
strained nature of WSNs and the IoT has not been adequately addressed.
2. The IDS placement strategy according to the current state-of-the-art, is
based on assumptions holding from conventional computer networks, and
thus a proper IDS placement strategy that addresses the nature of WSNs
and the IoT is needed.
3. The robustness of the current state-of-the-art IDS in WSNs and IoT has not
yet been extensively investigated.
4. The current-state-of-the-art IDSs in WSNs have been evaluated differently
due the lack of universal agreement on the effectiveness and efficiency eval-
uation metrics.
A possible solution to overcome these challenges is to use a hybrid architecture
that combines centralised and distributed IDS agents to avoid the disadvantages
of both architectures separately. Such a hybrid architecture would provide better
control of the IDS architecture since the centralised IDS agent is more power-
ful and rich in resources for performing complicated algorithms,procedures etc.
Furthermore, the hybrid architecture placement scheme may reduce the communi-
cation overheads and energy consumption caused by the detection procedure and
the communication between the base station and the nodes when it is integrated
with the partly distributed architecture. Our IDS will be based on a small subset
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of the nodes of the network (distributed IDS agents) to monitor local network
activity (e.g. by monitoring their 1-hop neighbours) and report this information
to the sink node (centralised) for post-processing. In addition, we will consider
dynamic distribution and randomise the IDS agent placement among the various
sensor nodes. In particular, we will use graph theory to design our solution in
order to formally investigate the particular characteristics of the IoT and WSN
paradigms. Our designed system will address the following characteristics of the
IoT and WSNs: their highly distributed nature; their ad-hoc network structure;
the peer-to-peer communication scheme among the devices; the highly constrained
nature of the devices per se in terms of resources (computational power, available
energy, limited memory etc.). Random Geometric Graphs have been used as a
well-studied model and a paradigm for wireless networks, such as sensor networks.
Motes are represented as vertices in RGG, and the communication between these
motes is represented by the edges. In other words, RGG can represent the actual
placing of the set of n vertices uniformly and randomly in the area of interest.
Following our network modelling with the use of RGG, we intend to investigate
and employ more formal and rigorous methods from graph theory.
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3.1 Introduction
This research introduces a hybrid intrusion detection architecture for IoT ad-hoc
networks that combines centralised and distributed models with a novel placement
strategy. The proposed approach respects the limitations and characteristics of
IoT and sensor networks in particular, such as: their highly distributed nature;
their ad-hoc network structure; the peer-to-peer communication scheme among
the devices; and the highly constrained nature of the devices per se in terms of
resources (computational power, available energy, limited memory, etc.). Random
Graphs have been employed as they are a well-studied model and a paradigm for
wireless networks, such as sensor networks.
This chapter describes the theoretical aspects of the proposed IDS for WSN and ad-
hoc networks. In particular, we present and describe the underlying design of the
proposed approach using a Random Geometric Graph followed by an optimisation
solution and algorithm for better IDS placement and resilience. The latter is
explored further in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.2 System Design Overview
According to the current state of the literature, IDSs designed for WSNs are clas-
sified according to their architecture as centralised, decentralised (distributed) and
hybrid architecture IDSs. The majority of existing IDSs are designed with a de-
centralised architecture, where the sensor node is responsible for detecting local
malicious nodes and attacks and is required to cooperate with neighbour nodes to
detect anomalies. The drawback of the decentralised architecture is that a sensor
node alone might be unable to detect some kinds of attacks since it has only a
local view of the network. Moreover, decentralised architecture approaches require
cooperation with other nodes in wireless networks in the detection procedure, that
increases the communication overhead between sensor nodes in WSNs. Meanwhile,
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a centralised IDS architecture requires the transfer of all relevant detection infor-
mation to the base station, which results in an intensive communication overhead.
In particular, all sensor nodes transfer relevant detection information to the base
station (sink node), which leads to base station failure. Finally, there is a hybrid
IDS architecture that combines centralised and distributed IDS agents. This ap-
proach has been introduced in the current state of the art. It gives all sensor nodes
part of the responsibility for detecting malicious activities, and all sensor nodes
participate in the detection procedure, which increases the combined overhead due
the massive communication between sensor nodes and base station.
In this research, we adopted a hybrid architecture combining centralised and dis-
tributed IDS agents. This combination helps to avoid the disadvantages of both
centralised and distributed architectures while capitalising on their advantages.
The hybrid architecture provides better control of the IDS architecture since the
centralised IDS agent is more powerful and rich in resources for performing compli-
cated algorithms and procedures. Furthermore, the hybrid architecture placement
scheme may reduce the communication overheads and energy consumption caused
by the detection procedure and the communication between the base station and
nodes when it is integrated with the partly distributed architecture. Our IDS will
be deployed on a small subset of the nodes of the network (distributed IDS agents)
to monitor local network activity (e.g. by monitoring their 1-hop neighbours) and
report this information to the sink node (centralised) for post-processing. Fur-
thermore, we consider random placement of IDS agents among the various sensor
nodes. In particular, we use graph theory to design our solution in order to prop-
erly account for the particular characteristics of the IoT and WSN paradigms.
The proposed system considers the characteristics of the IoT and WSNs outlined
earlier, whereas Random Geometric Graphs are used as they are a well-studied
formal analysis tool for wireless and sensor networks. Motes are represented as
vertices, and the communication between these motes is represented by the edges.
In other words, a random geometric graph can represent the actual placing of the
set of n vertices uniformly and randomly at the area of interest. By modelling the
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netwiork with the use of RGG, we investigate Vertex cover algorithms and employ
more formal and rigorous methods from graph theory.
Figure 3.1: The Proposed IDS Architecture
In the proposed IDS architecture, the global communication overheads between
sensor nodes and the base station will be reduced to the minimum since the small
set of sensor nodes work as a local sink and monitor the neighbour nodes in its
1-hop or cluster. We propose two different placement strategies based on graph
theories. The First placement algorithm is based on RGG. The RGG model ef-
ficiently captures spatial characteristics of the network that are closely related
to network connectivity e.g. inter-dependencies on the existence of wireless links
among neighbouring nodes. Then, motivated by the way in which IoT networking
protocols, such as RPL, manage and operate the network, we identify inherent
trade-offs between the communication overhead introduced by an IDS and its de-
tection rate of attacks, such as sinkhole attacks. We investigate this trade-off via
extended emulations and show there exists an underlying threshold behaviour in
the efficiency of the IDS that is related to the connectivity threshold of the RGG
model. Second, an IDS agent placement method is proposed as an optimisation
approach for IDS placement. We used the existing Vertex-cover algorithm to find
the minimum or close to minimum number of IDS agents with respect to the node
placement. Thus, we can have a lower number of IDS agents that helps to improve
the communication overhead and energy dissipation. Furthermore, we proposed
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an algorithm that integrates with the Vertex-cover approach to maintain and mon-
itor the distributed IDS agents against node failures. The central IDS frequently
checks the IDS agents against node failure. In the event any IDS node failing to
communicate with the central IDS, the central IDS agent will re-run the proposed
algorithm to select a new subset (cover set that covers other nodes) of the nodes
to act as IDS agents.
3.3 Proposed IDS Architecture Based on Ran-
dom Placement
We model a WSN with the use of RGG. The RGG model efficiently captures
spatial characteristics of the network that are closely related to network connec-
tivity; e.g. interdependencies on the existence of wireless links among neighbouring
nodes. Then, motivated by the way in which IoT networking protocols, such as
RPL, manage and operate the network, we identify inherent trade-offs between the
communication overhead introduced by an IDS and its detection rate of attacks,
such as the sinkhole attacks. We investigate this trade-off through extended emu-
lations and show there exists an underlying threshold behaviour in the efficiency
of the IDS that is related to the connectivity threshold of the RGG model.
3.3.1 Graph Theory
Within the domain of computer science and computer networks, graph theory
studies the relations among objects and their connection, which is used to rep-
resent network communications, data organisation etc. A graph is a represen-
tation of a set of objects (vertices or nods) that are interconnected over the
links called edges. Mathematically, a graph is a pair G = (V, E), where V is
a finite set of vertices and E is a finite set of edgesWest et al. (1996),Bolloba´s
(2013). For instance, the set V might be {, b, c, d, e, ƒ , g, h}, and E can be
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{{, d},{, c},{b, c},{b, e},{b, g},{c, ƒ},{d, e},
{g, h}}. Together, V and E are a graph G, as shown in Figure 3.2
Figure 3.2: Example of a Graph
.
3.3.2 Random Geometric Graph
Real-world networks are complex, and thus it is difficult to identify their exact
structure. Indeed, we only have incomplete information about their structure to
use for analysis. Random network models provide a better representation of ran-
dom and dynamic networks in order to determine long-term behaviour. Moreover,
random graphs allow researchers to design algorithms that can adhere to numerous
different structures Gupta and Kumar (2000),Durrett (2007).
RGG consists of a set of vertices that are randomly distributed in a d-dimensional
area, where an edge (,) exists only if the Euclidean distance of  and  is less
than R (the communication range). In wireless networks, R captures the ability
of a node to communicate with its 1-hop neighbour.
In random graphs with n vertices, the possibility of an edge is determined ran-
domly and independently of other edges with probability p ∈ [0; 1]. The proba-
bility p is the same as for all edges of G ∈ G(n;p).
The G(n, p) model has two parameters, n which is the number of vertices of
the graph, and p which is the edge probability. For each vertice,  and ,p
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is the probability that the edge (,) is present. The presence of each edge is
statistically independent of other edges (e.g. when  and  exist, then 
possibly also exists)Godsil and Royle (2013).
3.3.3 Connectivity threshold of RGG
In our proposed IDS, we consider an area A ⊂ R2 in a two-dimensional space. An
instance of the random geometric graphs model G(Xn; r) is constructed as follows:
select n points Xn uniformly at random in A. The set V = Xn is the set of vertices
of the graph, and we connect two vertices iff their Euclidean distance is at most
r. For any vertex  ∈ V, we will denote by N() the set of neighbours of  and
by deg() = |N()| its degree. Furthermore, we will denote by ‖ − ‖ the
Euclidean distance between the points corresponding to vertices , .
In Gupta and Kumar (1999) Penrose et al. (2016) it is shown that the connectivity
threshold for G(Xn; r) is
rc =
√√√ lnn
pin
(3.1)
3.3.4 Description of proposed system
Our proposed hybrid IDS architecture consists of two different IDS agents: a
centralised IDS and distributed IDS agent. These two different agents are the
main components of the proposed architecture; the central IDS located in the
base station (the sink node), and distributed IDS agent is installed in every single
sensor node. The distributed IDS agent monitors its neighbour nodes (e.g. by
monitoring their cluster) and collects data on local network activity from its 1-
hop neighbouring nodes for the central IDS agent, which is located at the sink
node. Meanwhile, the central IDS controls distributed IDS agents and manages
the detection procedure of the entire network.
Specifically, the proposed IDS architecture consists of a central detection agent
located in the base station and a distributed lightweight intrusion detection agent
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deployed on a subset of the network nodes, as shown in Figure 3.1. This combi-
nation is useful since it exploits the advantages and avoids the limitations of both
central and distributed architectures. The central agent manages the entire detec-
tion process and collects relevant data from the distributed agents. Each network
node that runs an instance of the distributed agent monitors and collects data on
local network activity from its 1-hop neighbouring nodes. This implies that not
all nodes need to run the IDS agent, but only a subset of them, such that every
node in the network has at least one 1-hop neighbour running the IDS agent. In
graph-theoretical terms, such a subset would be able to capture the structure of
the network. This also implies that there exists a minimum set of nodes that are
able to efficiently monitor the network without compromising the performance of
the IDS. This conjecture is explored empirically later on.
3.3.4.1 Central IDS
Central IDS is the main component of our proposed IDS, which is responsible for
monitoring the entire network and detecting anomalies. In addition, it is responsi-
ble for the self-organisation of the network and contains a global network monitor
that manages the monitoring task of other distributed agents. The detection en-
gine in the central IDS is responsible for the detection policy and manages other
IDS agents. The centralised IDS is placed in a special node within the network
called a sink node or base station. This node represents the border gateway device
located on the edge of the WSAN network, and it is powerful in terms of com-
puting power, memory and energy supplies. These features of the sink node allow
the centralised IDS to achieve better control and management of the monitoring
procedure and the entire IDS architecture.
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Algorithm 1 Detect Sinkhole Attacks
Require: M← the list of IDS agents nodes
Require: N←the list of Regular nodes
for Node in M do
for Node in N do
if (Node.Rank+IDSagentNodeRank
< Node.Parent.rank) then
Node.fault=Node.fault+1
end if
end for
end for
for Node in N do
if Node.fault>Threshold then
Alarm
end if
end for
3.3.4.2 Distributed IDS agent
The distributed IDS agent is the lightweight component of the proposed IDS ar-
chitecture that is placed on the sensor side. The sensor nodes in WSANs are
highly constrained in terms of resources (computational power, available energy,
limited memory, etc.). The distributed IDS agent is responsible for monitoring
and analysing the traffic within its cluster or 1-hop neighbours. Additionally, it
periodically provides the required and relevant detection information to the central
IDS.
3.3.4.3 Distributed IDS agent placement strategy
We focus on the placement strategy of distributed IDS agents since it is the critical
factor in designing security solution for WNSs and the IoT. Therefore, we adopt
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a hybrid IDS architecture, in which the central IDS is placed on the base station
and the distributed IDS agent is placed only on a subset of sensor nodes. The
IDS agent monitors traffic information within 1-hop neighbours. This network
information is available to be monitored by 1-hop neighbouring nodes. For any
set of neighbouring nodes, it suffices that only one of them is actively collecting
and reporting relevant information to the Sink. Therefore, it is not necessary for
all the sensor nodes to perform as IDS agents. This greatly reduces the number
of nodes that need to operate as IDS agents. At this point, we intend to study
and investigate the efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed IDS architecture.
We focus on evaluating the trade-off between the potentially reduced (percentage
of nodes acting as IDS agents is 100%, 80%, 60%, 40% and 20% of the total
population) accuracy of the IDS in successfully detecting attacks due to the smaller
number of active IDS agents in the network versus the reduced communication
overhead and increased energy efficiency of the network.
3.3.5 The Network Topology
Real-world networks have incomplete information about their structure that is
used for analysis. Random network models provide a suitable representation of
random and dynamic networks in order to determine long-term behaviour. More-
over, Random geometric graphs enable the design of algorithms that can be applied
to many different structures. RGG represent the actual placing of the set of n
vertices uniformly and randomly at the area of interest Bolloba´s (2004).
We consider that the random uniform placement of the sensors inside the network
area is abstracted by a Random Geometric Graph. RGG is formed by n vertices
that are placed uniformly at random in the [0,1]2 square. An edge (,) exists
iff the Euclidean distance of vertices  and  is at most r, where r corresponds
to the wireless communication radius r of the sensors. This holds assuming a disc
radio model; two sensors can communicate with each other iff each one lies inside
the communication range of the other. Random Geometric Graphs also have an
important nice property: unlike other random graphs, like Gn,p, edges are not
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statistically independent of each other. That is, the existence of an edge (,)
is not independent of the existence of edges (,) and (,). This property
makes RGG a realistic model for WSANs, as it captures to a great extent the
communication structure of real networks (at least their spatial aspects).
Particularly, we consider an area A ⊂ R2 in two dimensional space. An instance
of the random geometric graphs model G(Xn; r) is constructed as follows: select
n points Xn uniformly at random in A. The set V = Xn is the set of vertices of
the graph and we connect two vertices iff their euclidean distance is at most r.
For any vertex  ∈ V, we will denote by N() the set of neighbours of  and
by deg() = |N()| its degree. Furthermore, we will denote by ‖ − ‖ the
Euclidean distance between the points corresponding to vertices , .
The RGG model provides a formal tool of constructing and characterising networks
as ”sparse, dense or normal”. We also later find that this threshold also indicates
the number of IDS agents needed in order to efficiently monitor a peer-to-peer
ad-hoc wireless network Gross and Tucker (2001).
3.3.6 Implementation Plan
We apply our proposed approach to the state-of-the-art IDS for WSN of Raza et
al. called SVELTE Raza et al. (2013). Their proposed IDS has a hybrid architec-
ture that consists of a centralised module running on the Sink and a distributed
agent running on each individual sensor node. The centralised module contains
the 6LoWPAN Mapper (6Mapper), which is responsible for gathering information
from the sensor nodes on the network topology. In particular, 6Mapper collects
information on the rank assigned to each node by the RPL protocol (responsible
for constructing and maintaining a global tree-like network structure in a dis-
tributed manner), which is closely related to the hop distance of each node from
the Sink. This allows a second component - the intrusion detection component -
to reconstruct and monitor the network topology for anomalies that indicate an
intrusion.
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For instance, a sinkhole attack could be deployed via a compromised node by
having this node falsely announcing a significantly smaller rank to its neighbours.
This causes its neighbouring nodes to assume that its distance to the Sink is much
smaller than it actual is, thus directing all network traffic through the compromised
node.
3.3.7 Evaluation Environment
We will evaluate the proposed approach experimentally using the Cooja emulator
Osterlind et al. (2006). The Cooja emulator provides a detailed cross-layer sim-
ulation for WSNs running the 6LoWPAN stack. In our experiments, we consider
three qualitatively distinct network densities as they are indicated by the RGG
model. In particular, we consider a network area A = [0,100]2, where n sensor
motes are deployed uniformly at random, for n ∈ {32,64,128}. Following from
equation 3.2, for each value of n, the corresponding network connectivity threshold
is rc : {18.5; 14.3; 11}, respectively. Thus, the communication range will be
be r = 20. Thus, the RGG model provides us with a formal tool for constructing
and characterising networks as ”sparse”, ”dense” or ”normal”.
rc =
√√√ lnn
pin
(3.2)
Then, for each network density, we consider five scenarios, where we will reduce the
percentage of nodes acting as IDS agents to 80%, 60%, 40% and 20% of the total
population. In each case, we will set 10% of the node population to act as malicious
nodes deploying sinkhole attacks by exploiting the rank mechanism of RPL. Any
remaining nodes are regular nodes. We will consider 10 random instances of the
network; this allows us to effectively mitigate in our simulations any issues that
might occur due to the random network topology. We consider 10 iterations for
each instance running for 3600 seconds, where nodes generate and transmit data
approximately every second. For each scenario and each performance metric, we
will compute average values and 95% confidence intervals.
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3.3.8 Attacker Model
In our experiments, we consider sinkhole attacks because of this kind of attack is
the one of most critical in the network layer. A sinkhole attack is an insider attack
where an attacker compromises a node inside the network and launches an attack.
The malicious node in this attack advertises a beneficial path in order to attract its
neighbour nodes to route the traffic through it based on the routing metric used in
the routing protocol. This kind of attack does not disrupt the network operation,
but it affects the data integrity and confidentiality in the network Kamble et al.
(2017).
A sinkhole attack could be deployed over a compromised node by having this node
falsely announce a significantly lower rank to its neighbours. This would have its
neighbouring nodes assume that its distance to the Sink is much smaller than the
actual one, thus directing all network traffic through the compromised node.
3.3.9 Evaluation metrics
The aim of the proposed approach is to address the constrained nature of WSNs,
especially in terms of resources (computational power, available energy, limited
memory, etc). Therefore, we focus on the IDS architecture, with a focus on IDS
placement since it is an essential factor of communication overheads and energy
consumption in constraint networks. Thus, we define evaluation metrics that
capture the trade-off between energy consumption /communication overheads with
the detection rate of malicious activities.
3.3.9.1 Detection Rate
We define the detection rate as the number of true positives of malicious nodes
over the total number of malicious nodes in the network.
Detection rate =
number of true positive detections
total number of malicious nodes
(3.3)
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3.3.9.2 Communication Overhead
The communication unit in WSNs nodes is responsible for sending and receiving
node data. The transceiver usually has several operation states: T,R,Oƒ ƒ ,
de, Seep and Cer Chanel Assessment/Energy Detect (CCA/ED) (Zhou
et al. 2011). The transceiver energy consumption can be calculated by summing
the state energy consumption and state-transition energy consumption.
Energy state consumption can be calculated from the following expression Zhou
et al. (2011)Pantazis et al. (2013)Khanmirza and Yazdani (2016):
Etrns−stte = ETX + ERX + Ede + Eseep + ECCA (3.4)
Energy consumption in data communication is the most expensive factor in WSNs
energy dissipation. For instance, the energy cost of transmitting 1 KB a distance
of 100 m is approximately the same as that for executing three million instructions
by a 100 (MIPS)/W processor(Zhou et al. 2011). Therefore, we define the com-
munication overhead as the additional volume of data communication introduced
in the network as a result of the operation of the IDS. We follow the practice of
Raza et al. (2013) and monitor this metric only to the 1-hop neighbouring nodes
of the Sink (the rationale is that any network traffic will have to go through these
nodes prior to reaching the Sink). We denote by EIDS the energy consumption of
the said nodes with the IDS running and with EIDS the energy consumption of the
said nodes with no IDS running in the network.
Communication overhead =
EIDS − EIDS
EIDS
(3.5)
3.3.9.3 Total Energy Consumption in the Network
Energy consumption is a critical issue in WSNs because of the constrained energy
resource related to the manufacturer, and sensor nodes are usually powered by
two AA batteries. The sensor node in WSN consists of a power unit, sensing
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unit, processing unit and communication unit. These components work together
to gather sensing data from the WSN environment and transmit these data to
end user via the base station. Ying et. al Zhou et al. (2011) presented the energy
consumption in the processing unit, sensing unit and wireless communication unit.
We measure the total energy consumption ΔEtot in the network as the difference
between the total available energy in the network at the beginning of a simulation
and at the end. We denote the initial available energy for sensor  by E
init
and the
initial available energy for sensor  by E
final
:
ΔEtot = ∈n(Einit − Efinal) (3.6)
3.4 Proposed IDS Architecture Based on the Cover
Set Algorithm
We introduce a hybrid architecture IDS for IoT networks that consists of cen-
tralised and distributed IDS agents integrated with a novel placement strategy.
In our approach, the IDS architecture can detect and mitigate the effect of node
failures. First, we model a WSN with the use of RGG. The RGG model efficiently
captures spatial characteristics of the network that are closely related to network
connectivity (e.g. inter-dependencies on the existence of wireless links among
neighbouring nodes). Then, motivated by how IoT networking protocols, such
as RPL, manage and operate the network, we identify the trade-offs between the
communication overhead introduced by an IDS and its detection rate of attacks,
such as the sinkhole attack. We investigate this trade-off via extended emulations
and show that it is not necessary for all nodes to act as IDS agents. Furthermore,
we show that the proposed architecture is able to efficiently cope with and mitigate
the effects of node failures on the the efficiency of the IDS.
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3.4.1 Vertex Cover in Graph Theory
A vertex cover (node cover) in a graph is a subset of vertices in which every edge
in the graph is connected to at least one vertex in the cover. The purpose of the
vertex cover algorithm is to find the smallest set of vertices that covers the whole
graph with the minimum number of nodes. Mathematically, a vertex cover V′ of
a graph G = (V, E) is a subset of V such that  ∈ E ⇒  ∈ V′ ∨  ∈ V′.
For instance, in a given graph G = {1,2,3,4,5,6}, as in Figure 3.3, and a set of
edges E = {{1,2},{1,3},{2,4},{3,4},{4,5},{4,6}}, the union of E is
equal to G. However, it is possible to cover all the vertices in G with S = {1,4},
as shown in Figure 3.4 since vertex number 1 is in touch with vertices {2,3} and
vertex number 4 in touch with {2,3,5,6}.
Figure 3.3: Indicative Example of Graph
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Figure 3.4: The Vertex Cover of the Graph
3.4.2 Description of the proposed IDS Architecture
We introduce a hybrid IDS architecture that consists of a central detection agent
located in the base station and a distributed lightweight intrusion detection agent
deployed on a subset of the network nodes, as shown in Figure 3.1. The central IDS
controls the entire IDS architecture and relevant data from the distributed agents.
Each network node that runs an instance of the distributed agent monitors and
collects data on local network activity from its 1-hop neighbouring nodes. This
implies that not all nodes need to run the IDS agent, but only a subset of them,
such that every node in the network has at least one 1-hop neighbour operating
as an IDS agent. In graph theory, such a subset is defined as a vertex cover of the
corresponding RGG graph that captures the structure of the network. In our ap-
proach (Algorithm 1), the subset of nodes that act as IDS agents is selected based
on the Vertex-cover algorithm Asgeirsson and Stein (2007) (greedy algorithm) to
find a subset of minimum cardinality with proper placement. Moreover, we pro-
pose a method to maintain and monitor the distributed IDS agents against node
failures. As shown in Algorithm 1, the central IDS frequently checks the set of IDS
agents against node failures. In case any of the IDS nodes fail to communicate
with the central IDS, the central IDS agent will re-run the proposed algorithm to
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select a new subset of nodes to act as IDS agents. Centralised IDS and distributed
IDS agents are the main components of the proposed architecture; central IDS
agent is located in the base station (the sink node) and distributed IDS agents
are installed in every single sensor node. A Distributed IDS agent monitors its
neighbour nodes (e.g. by monitoring their cluster) monitors and collects data on
local network activity from its 1-hop neighbouring nodes for the central IDS agent,
which is located at the sink node. Meanwhile, the central IDS controls distributed
IDS agents and manages the detection procedure of the entire network. Our pro-
posed architecture is able to efficiently cope with and mitigate the effects of node
failure on the efficiency of the IDS.
3.4.2.1 Central IDS
The central IDS agent is located at the base station, and is and is responsible
for monitoring the entire network and detecting anomalies. It is also responsible
for locating distributed IDS agents based on the vertex-cover algorithm, which
allow nodes to act as IDS agents with proper placement to cover the network with
minimum number of nodes. The detection engine in the central IDS is responsible
for enforcing the detection policy and manages other IDS agents. The centralised
IDS is placed on the Sink node or base station. This node represents the border
gateway device located on the edge of the WSAN network and is powerful in terms
of computing power, memory and energy supplies. Furthermore, the centralised
IDS maintains and monitors the distributed IDS agents against node failure. The
central IDS frequently checks the set of IDS agents against node failures. In case
any of the IDS nodes fail to communicate with the central IDS, the central IDS
agent will re-run the proposed Algorithm 6 to select a new subset of the nodes to
act as IDS agents.
3.4.2.2 Distributed IDS agent
The distributed IDS agent is the lightweight component of the proposed IDS archi-
tecture that is placed on the sensor’s side. The distributed IDS agent is responsible
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for monitoring and analysing the traffic within its cluster or 1-hop neighbours. In
addition, it periodically provides the required and relevant detection information
to the central IDS.
3.4.2.3 Placement Strategy of the Distributed IDS Agent
The main idea of the proposed method is to improve the energy efficiency and
maintain the level of performance of an IDS in IoT and ad-hoc networks. IDS
placement strategy is one of the critical factors that effects the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of the IDS security solution. Networking protocols for IoT and wireless
networks are designed to address the distributed ad-hoc nature of IoT networks
using local network information available to the nodes such as RPL. This network
information can be monitored by 1-hop neighbouring nodes. Therefore, for a given
set of neighbouring nodes, it suffices that only one of them is actively collecting
and reporting relevant information to the Sink. This greatly reduces the number
of nodes that need to operate as IDS agents, thus mitigating any scalability and
performance issues. This subset of nodes in the network can monitor the entire
network properly. The subset of nodes that act as IDS agents is selected based
on the vertex-cover algorithm Asgeirsson and Stein (2007) (greedy algorithm)6 to
find a subset of minimum cardinality with proper placement.
Algorithm 2 IDS Agent Placement
Require: N← the list of nodes
Require: S←the list of neighbour nodes
Require: A←IDS Agents
while N 6= ∅ do
Select a set of neighbours ∈ S that maximise S ∩ N
N← N − S
A← A ∪ S	
end while
return A
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3.4.2.4 Resiliency algorithms
A method to maintain and monitor the distributed IDS agents against node failure
is proposed. As shown in Algorithm 3, the central IDS frequently checks the set of
IDS agents against node failure. In case any of the IDS nodes fail to communicate
with the central IDS, the central IDS agent will re-run our proposed algorithm to
select a new subset of nodes to act as IDS agents in order to efficiently cope with
and mitigate the effects of node failure on the the efficiency of the IDS.
Algorithm 3 Detect Sinkhole Attacks and Placement/Resilience Methods
Require: N← the list of nodes
Require: S← the list of neighbour nodes
Require: A← the list of selected Node to run as an IDS agent
Require: A′ ← A
1: while A = ∅ OR A 6= A′ do
2: while N 6= ∅ do
3: Select a set of neighbours ∈ S that maximise S ∩ N
4: N← N − S
5: A← A ∪ S	
6: A′ ← A
7: return A,A′
8: end while
9: end while
10: for Node in A do
11: for Node in S do
12: if (Node.Rank+IDSagentNodeRank
13: < Node.Parent.rank) then
14: Node.fault++
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: for Node in N do
19: if Node.fault>Threshold then
20: Raise Alarm
21: end if
22: end for
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3.4.3 The Network Model
We model such networks as RGG, a formal model capturing underlying structural
properties of the network. We then introduce a novel IDS architectural approach,
in which only a minimum subset of the nodes act as IDS agents. These nodes
are able to monitor the network and detect attacks at the networking layer in
a collaborative manner by monitoring 1-hop network information provided by
routing protocols, such as RPL. We consider the random placement of the sensor
nodes in the network area by a RGG. RGGs are constructed by n vertices that
are placed at random in the area of interest [0,1]2. An edge (,) exists iff
the Euclidean distance of vertices  and  is at most r, where r is the radius
(wireless communication range) r of the sensors. RGG represents a realistic model
for WSANs since it captures the extent of the communication structure of real
networks including spatial aspects . Specifically, we consider an area A ⊂ R2 in
two-dimensional space. An instance of the RGG model G(Xn; r) is constructed as
follows: for n points Xn is uniformly place at random in A. The set V = Xn is the
set of vertices of the graph, and we connect two vertices iff their Euclidean distance
is at most r. For any vertex  ∈ V, we denote by N() the set of neighbours
of  and by deg() = |N()| its degree. Further, we denote by ‖ − ‖ the
Euclidean distance between the points corresponding to vertices , . The RGG
model provides us with a formal tool of constructing and characterising networks
as ”sparse”, ”dense” or ”normal”.
3.4.4 Implementation Plan
As with the random placement algorithm described earlier, we apply this approach
using SVELTE Raza et al. (2013).
The RPL routing protocol maintains the routing paths between the Sink and the
rest of the network nodes by constructing a global network topology using the Des-
tination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG). Initially, the Sink broadcasts
messages to its immediate neighbouring nodes, which in turn reiterate the process
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to their neighbouring nodes lying further away in the network. The process is
run recursively and eventually results in each node being assigned a rank that
depends on its actual hop-distance to the Sink as well as the link quality between
neighbouring nodes (as measured by an objective function, such as the ETX met-
ric). In SVELTE, the 6Mapper periodically collects these ranks to reconstruct the
DODAG centrally at the Sink in order to monitor the network against relevant
attacks - like sinkhole attack - by detecting corresponding anomalies, as shown
in Algorithm 1; for example, if the rank of a node significantly deviates from the
rank of its neighbours. The central IDS periodically broadcasts requests requests
that are five bytes in length, while the IDS agents in each individual sensor node
send responses that are 17 bytes long.
3.4.5 Evaluation Environment
We ran our experiments in two parts. The first part of the experiment was con-
ducted to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed IDS architecture.
Our proposed approach aims to find a minimum subset of nodes that are able to
monitor the network efficiently. The second part of our experiment was conducted
to evaluate our algorithm, which was integrated with the proposed IDS architec-
ture in order to mitigate IDS agent failure. For both experiments, we used Cooja
Osterlind et al. (2006), which provides a detailed cross-layer simulation for WSNs
running the 6LoWPAN stack. We consider three qualitatively distinct network
densities as they are indicated by the RGG model. Particularly, we consider a
network area A = [0,100]2, where n sensor motes are deployed uniformly at
random, for n ∈ {32,64,128}. We get three network setups in which r is (a)
almost equal to (b) ×1.5 and (c)×2 the connectivity threshold, thus resulting in
(a) sparse, (b) normal and (c) dense networks (see Appendix A).
For each network density, we consider algorithm 6, where the nodes act as IDS
agents selected based on the cover set algorithm, namely, the greedy algorithm. In
each case, we set 10% of the node population to act as malicious nodes deploying
sinkhole attacks by exploiting the rank mechanism of RPL. Any remaining nodes
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are regular nodes. Furthermore, in the second part of our experiment we gradually
drop off some nodes that perform as IDS agents during the simulation to evaluate
the redundancy of our approach.
For each network configuration, we also run a scenario with no nodes operating as
IDS nodes. For each scenario, we create 10 random instances of the network; this
allows us to effectively mitigate any issues in our simulations that might occur
due to the random network topology (in other words, we sample the space of
RGG instances). For each instance, we run 10 iterations of simulating the network
operation for a simulation time of 3600 seconds where nodes generate and transmit
data approximately every second. For each scenario and each performance metric,
we compute average values and 95% confidence intervals.
3.4.6 Attacker Model
In this research, we consider network layer type of attacks. Therefore, we consider
in conducted experiments for this research sinkhole attack on RPL routing protocol
for constrained networks as an attacker model and an use case. We consider
the IDS architecture and the IDS agents’ placement strategies regardless of the
detection accuracy. We investigate the underline cause of the communication and
energy consumption overheads introduced to constrained networks by Intrusion
Detection System. The proposed IDS architecture and the IDS agent placement
strategies can be extended to detect attacks in other routing protocols.
A sinkhole attack is an insider attack, in which an attacker compromises a node
inside the network and launches an attack. The malicious node in this attack
advertises a beneficial path in order to attract its neighbour nodes to route the
traffic through it based on the routing metric used in the routing protocol. This
kind of attack does not disrupt the network operation but it affects the integrity
and confidentiality aspects Kamble et al. (2017).
A sinkhole attack could be deployed through a compromised node by having this
node falsely announcing a significantly smaller rank to its neighbours. This will
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cause the neighbouring nodes to assume that its distance to the Sink is much
smaller than the actual one, thus directing all network traffic through the com-
promised node.
3.4.7 Evaluation Metrics
The aim of our proposed approach is to properly address the constrained nature
of WSNs, especially in terms of resources (computational power, available energy,
limited memory, etc.). Therefore, we focus on IDS architecture with a special
emphasis on IDS placement since it is an essential factor in communication over-
heads and energy consumption in constraint networks. Thus, we define evaluation
metrics that capture the trade-off between energy consumption/communication
overhead with the detection rate of malicious activities.
3.4.7.1 Detection Rate
We define the detection rate as the number of true positive detections of malicious
nodes over the total number of malicious nodes in the network.
Detection rate =
number of true positive detections
total number of malicious nodes
(3.7)
3.4.7.2 Communication Overheads
The communication unit in WSN nodes is responsible for sending and receiving
nodes data. The transceiver usually has several operation states: T,R,Oƒ ƒ , de
Sleep and Clear Chanel Assessment/Energy Detect (CCA/ED) (Zhou et al. 2011)Ish-
manov et al. (2011)Xu et al. (2012)Huang et al. (2009)Chouhan et al. (2009). The
transceiver energy consumption can be calculated by summing the state energy
consumption and state-transition energy consumption.
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The energy state consumption can be calculated as follows Zhou et al. (2011)Pan-
tazis et al. (2013)Khanmirza and Yazdani (2016):
Etrns−stte = ETX + ERX + Ede + Eseep + ECCA (3.8)
Energy consumption in data communication is the most expensive factor in WSN
energy dissipation. For instance, the energy cost of transmitting 1 KB a distance
of 100 m is approximately the same as that for executing three million instructions
using a 100 (MIPS)/W processor(Zhou et al. 2011)Bouabdallah et al. (2008)Abo-
Zahhad et al. (2015)Alkalbani et al. (2013). Therefore, we define the communica-
tion overhead as the additional volume of data communication introduced in the
network as a result of the operation of the IDS. We follow the practice of Raza
et al. (2013) and monitor this metric only to the 1-hop neighbouring nodes of the
Sink (the rationale is that any network traffic will have to go through these nodes
prior to reaching the Sink). We denote by EIDS the energy consumption of the
nodes with the IDS running and with EIDS the energy consumption of the nodes
with no IDS running in the network.
Communication overhead =
EIDS − EIDS
EIDS
(3.9)
3.4.7.3 Total Energy Consumption in the Network
Energy consumption is the critical issue in WSNs because of the constrained en-
ergy resource, which is related to the manufacturer, and sensor nodes are usually
powered by two AA batteries. The sensor node in WSNs consists of a power unit,
sensing snit, processing unit and communication unit. These components work
togather to collect sensing data about the WSN environment and transmit these
data to the end user through the base station. Ying et. al Zhou et al. (2011)
identified the energy consumption in the processing unit, sensing unit and wireless
communication unit. We measure the total energy consumption ΔEtot in the
network as the difference between the total available energy in the network at the
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beginning of a simulation and at the end. We denote initial available energy for
sensor  by E
init
and the initial available energy for sensor  by E
final
.
ΔEtot = ∈n(Einit − Efinal) (3.10)
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter describes a hybrid IDS architecture that combines centralised and dis-
tributed architectures for ad-hoc and wireless networks. This combination makes
it possible to reduce the massive communication required for the distributed IDS
monitor its immediate neighbours nodes and report relevant detection informa-
tion to the Sink. Moreover, this combination uses the advantages of both the
centralised and distributed detection models, where the centralised model pro-
vides better control on the detection procedure than the distributed model. In
addition, the distributed model is beneficial in communication overheads reduc-
tion. The distributed model is based on a small set of sensor nodes, which function
as a local sink and monitor the neighbour nodes in its 1-hop or cluster. Dynamic
distribution and randomisation of the IDS agent placement among the various
sensor nodes has been considered in the proposed IDS architecture. Furthermore,
the distributed model placement based on the vertex cover algorithm from graph
theory has been used as an optimisation solution to enhance the placement and
resilience of the distributed model.
Chapter 4
Evaluation of the Proposed IDS
Architecture
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter reports on the detailed experimental evaluation and results of the
proposed IDS architecture for WSN and ad-hoc networks based on random place-
ment using RGG.
The trade-off between the communication and energy overheads of an IDS (as
captured by the number of active IDS agents in the network) and the performance
of the system in terms of successfully identifying attacks is studied. As outlined
in the previous chapter, we model such networks as a RGG, a rigorous approach
that formally expresses the underlying structural properties of the network. Then,
we introduce a novel IDS architectural approach by having only a subset of the
nodes function as IDS agents. These nodes are able to efficiently detect attacks
at the networking layer in a collaborative manner by monitoring locally available
network information provided by IoT routing protocols, such as RPL.
This Chapter presents the experimental evaluation of the proposed approach through
simulation. We evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed approach
and discuss the experimental results and findings.
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4.2 The Proposed IDS
As mentioned in the previous chapters, RPL establishes and maintains routing
paths between the Sink and the rest of the network nodes by constructing a global
tree-like network structure in a distributed way; the Destination Oriented Directed
Acyclic Graph (DODAG). The process is initiated by the Sink broadcasting ex-
ploratory messages to its immediate neighbouring nodes, which in turn reiterates
the process to their neighbouring nodes lying further away in the network. The
process is run recursively and eventually results in each node being assigned a rank
that depends on its actual hop-distance to the Sink as well as the link quality be-
tween neighbouring nodes (as measured by an objective function, such as the ETX
metric). In SVELTE, the 6Mapper periodically collects these ranks to reconstruct
the DODAG centrally at the Sink in order to monitor the network against relevant
attacks - like sinkhole - by detecting corresponding anomalies; for example, if the
rank of a node significantly deviates from the rank of its neighbours.
While for each individual node the introduced communication overhead may be
small (the messages carrying the 6Mapper requests are five bytes long while each
response from the nodes is 17 bytes long), engaging each individual node in the
process introduces a communication overhead that is proportional to the size of
the network. This poses significant scalability issues and adversely affects the
connectivity and availability of the network because, in multi-hop peer-to-peer
networks, nodes closer to the Sink also serve traffic coming from the rest of the
network.
They key idea behind the proposed approach is that networking protocols designed
to address the distributed ad-hoc nature of peer-to-peer IoT networks (such as
IPv6-enabled WSNs) make use of network information that is locally available to
the nodes, such as in the case of RPL. This network information can be easily
shared or even be monitored by 1-hop neighbouring nodes. Therefore, for a given
set of neighbouring nodes, it suffices that only one of them is actively collecting
and reporting relevant information to the Sink. This greatly reduces the number
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of nodes that need to operate as IDS agents, thus mitigating any scalability and
performance issues.
In this work, we focus on experimentally investigating and evaluating our approach
by extending SVELTE (the current state-of-the-art IDS for IPv6-enabled WSNs).
In particular, we focus on evaluating the trade-off between the potentially reduced
accuracy of the IDS in detecting attacks (due to the smaller number of active IDS
agents in the network) versus the reduced communication overhead and increased
energy efficiency of the network.
Algorithm 4 Detect Sinkhole Attacks
Require: M← the list of IDS agents nodes
Require: N← the list of Regular nodes
1: for Node in M do
2: for Node in N do
3: if (Node.Rank+IDSagentNodeRank
4: < Node.Parent.rank) then
5: Node.fault=Node.fault+1
6: end if
7: end for
8: end for
9: for Node in N do
10: if Node.fault>Thershold then
11: Alarm
12: end if
13: end for
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4.3 Experimental Evaluation
4.3.1 Implementation Plan
We ran our experiments using the Cooja Osterlind et al. (2006) emulator, which
provides a detailed cross-layer simulation for WSNs running the 6LoWPAN stack.
We consider three qualitatively distinct network densities as they are indicated by
the RGG model. In particular, we consider a network area A = [0,100]2, where
n sensor motes are deployed uniformly at random, for n ∈ {32,64,128}. Fol-
lowing equation 3.2, for each value of n, the corresponding network connectivity
threshold is rc : {18.5; 14.3; 11}. Therefore, by setting the sensors’ commu-
nication range to be r = 20, we get three network setups, where r is (a) almost
equal to, (b) ×1.5 and (c)×2 the connectivity threshold, thus resulting in (a)
sparse, (b) normal and (c) dense networks. Figures ??, ?? and ?? provide a
visual representation of the various network densities.
For each network density, we consider five scenarios, where the percentage of nodes
acting as IDS agents is 100%, 80%, 60%, 40% and 20% of the total population
(yellow nodes in the corresponding figures, see Appendix ??). Furthermore, in
each case, we set 10% of the node population to act as malicious nodes (nodes
in purple) deploying sinkhole attacks by exploiting the rank mechanism of RPL.
Any remaining nodes are regular nodes (nodes in green). For each network con-
figuration, we also run a scenario with no nodes operating as IDS nodes. For
each scenario we create 10 random instances of the network; this allows us to
effectively mitigate in our simulations any issues that might occur due to the ran-
dom network topology (in other words we sample the space of RGG instances).
For each instance, we run 10 iterations of simulating the network operation for a
simulation time of 3600 seconds, in which the nodes generate and transmit data
approximately every second. For each scenario and each performance metric, we
compute average values and 95% confidence intervals.
Our findings demonstrate a strong concentration around the mean and are there-
fore deemed statistically significant.
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4.3.2 Evaluation Metrics
In the following subsections, we define the metrics that are used to evaluate our
proposed IDS architecture.
4.3.2.1 Detection Rate
We define the detection rate as the number of true positive detections of malicious
nodes over the total number of malicious nodes in the network.
Detection rate =
number of true positive detections
total number of malicious nodes
(4.1)
4.3.2.2 Communication Overhead
We define the communication overheads as the additional volume of data com-
munication introduced in the network as a result of the operation of the IDS. We
follow the practise of Raza et al. (2013) and monitor this metric only to the 1-hop
neighbouring nodes of the Sink (the rationale is that any network traffic will have
to go through these nodes prior to reaching the Sink). We denote by EIDS the
energy consumption of the said nodes with the IDS running and with EIDS the
energy consumption of the nodes with no IDS running in the network. Then,
Communication overhead =
EIDS − EIDS
EIDS
(4.2)
4.3.2.3 Total Energy Consumption in the Network
We measure the total energy consumption ΔEtot in the network as the difference
between the total available energy in the network at the beginning of a simulation
and at the end. We denote initial available energy for sensor  by E
init
and the
initial available energy for sensor  by E
final
. Then,
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ΔEtot = ∈n(Einit − Efinal) (4.3)
4.3.3 Results
Figure 4.1 shows that in sparse networks the detection rate remains as high as 85%
for the scenarios where 100% and 85% of the node population operates as an IDS
agent. However, the detection rate drops to 60% for 60% of the population as IDS
agents, and it continues to drop further as the percentage of the agents is reduced.
This demonstrates that the IDS performance in sparse networks quickly drops due
to the fact that areas of the network remain un-monitored. We note, however,
that there is a certain level of resilience for high percentages of IDS agents.
Figure 4.1: Sparse network
Figure 4.2 shows the findings for networks of normal density. We note two points.
First, the IDS demonstrates a greater degree of resilience, as it achieves high
detection rates even for percentages of IDS agents as low as 40% of the node
population. Second, when 100% of the nodes are IDS agents the simulation was
not completed due to the fact that the network was rendered disconnected, as the
motes lying close to the Sink were not able to handle the increased network traffic.
This highlights the network strain that even light-weight IDSs introduce.
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Figure 4.2: Normal density network
This is also the reason why other works in the literature on IoT and WSN IDS limit
their simulation studies to networks with small populations. Figure 4.3 further
highlights these findings, as the simulations failed to complete for scenarios with
large numbers of IDS agents (percentages of 100% and 80%). Additionally, in dense
networks the detection rate of the IDS remained at very high levels (approximately
80%-85%).
Figure 4.3: Dense network
At this point, we make another important observation. For all three network
densities, the detection rate of the IDS starts to deteriorate significantly (and as
shown in Figure 4.1, proportionally to the reduction in IDS agents percentage)
once the absolute number of IDS agents in the network drops below a constant
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threshold; in this case, below 25 IDS nodes (corresponding to 32·80%; 64·40%;
128 · 20%). This implies that only a constant number of IDS agents is needed
to effectively and efficiently monitor the network.
Figure 4.4: Energy consumption and communication overhead for the entire
network of sparse networks
This is a very strong indication that the efficiency of a hybrid/distributed IDS for
peer-to-peer ad-hoc networks is independent of the number of nodes but related
to underlying fundamental properties of the network. Following our network mod-
elling with the use of RGG, we notice that this property is the size of the minimum
vertex cover of the corresponding RGG instance. We intend to investigate this in
our future work employing more formal and rigorous methods from graph theory.
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Figure 4.5: Energy consumption and communication overhead introduced by
the IDS of sparse networks
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the average energy consumption and the communication
overheads introduced by the IDS of sparse networks. We note that for all five
scenarios (the percentage of nodes acting as IDS agents is 100%, 80%, 60%, 40%
and 20% of the total population) the overall communication overhead and energy
consumption of the network is proportional to the number of nodes operating as
IDS agents. Correlating to Figure 4.1, the detection rate in the scenario where 80%
of nodes acting as IDS agents remain at high level as 100% IDS agents scenario.
This shows that our approach achieved lower communication overhead and energy
consumption while maintaining a high detection rate.
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Figure 4.6: Energy consumption and communication overhead for the entire
moderate dense networks
Figures 4.6 and 4.9 show the average energy consumption and the communication
overhead of moderately dense networks. The communication overhead and energy
consumption of networks is also proportional to the number of nodes operating as
IDS agents for all five scenarios (the percentage of nodes acting as IDS agents is
100%, 80%, 60%, 40% and 20% of the total population). In Figure 4.2, the IDS
achieves high detection detection rates at percentages of 40%, 60% and 80% of
the node population. However, the detection rate drops quickly in scenarios with
20% of nodes acting as IDS agents. In moderate dense networks, the IDS with
40% agents achieved high detection rate with lower energy consumption compared
with the other scenarios.
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Figure 4.7: Energy consumption and communication overhead introduced by
the IDS of moderate dense networks
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the average energy consumption and communication
overhead of dense networks. The IDS achieves high detection rates as shown in
Figure 4.3 for for IDS percentages of 20%, 40% and 60% of of the node population.
However, the simulations with 80% and 100% failed to complete due to the massive
communication overheads generated by the large number of IDS agents. For dense
networks, the IDS with 20% of the nodes population performing as IDS agent
achieved lower energy consumption scenarios while maintaining a high detection
rate.
Figure 4.8: Energy consumption and communication overhead for the entire
network of dense networks
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Figure 4.9: Energy consumption and communication overhead introduced by
the IDS of dense networks
This shows the massive gains that can be achieved by fine-tuning the trade-off
between energy efficiency and the achieved high detection rate as a result of using
a constant number of IDS agents. Detailed experimental evaluation demonstrates
significant performance gains in terms of communication overheads and energy
dissipation while maintaining high detection rates. We also show that the perfor-
mance of our IDS in ad-hoc networks not only relies on the size of the network but
also on fundamental underlying network properties, such as the network topology
and the average degree of the nodes.
4.4 Conclusion
This work studies efficient and lightweight IDS for ad-hoc networks via the prism
of IPv6-enabled WSN. First, it provides a formal model for WSNs with the using
RGG, a graph-theoretical model that captures the spatial characteristics of WSNs,
such as interdependencies on the existence of wireless links among neighbouring
nodes. Then, motivated by the operation of IoT-specific networking protocols,
such as RPL, we focus on network attacks, such as the sinkhole or man-in-the-
middle attack. We identify and attempt to optimise the trade-off between energy
efficiency and communication overhead on one hand and the IDS detection rate
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on the other. By leveraging upon the distributed nature of such protocols and
locally available network information, we propose a method for IDS that requires
only a subset of the nodes to operate as IDS agents.
We extend state-of-the-art IDS for WSNs by integrating our method and conduct
our performance evaluation via extensive emulations. We consider various network
densities (as these are formally defined through the RGG model) and show that 1)
the IDS detection rates remain at very high levels (around 85%) even with a subset
of the nodes as IDS agents; 2) the required number of IDS agents in the network
in order to achieve these levels is independent from the network population and in
fact constant ; 3) the energy consumption and communication overhead introduced
by the IDS is proportional to the number of IDS agents, thus our method allows
for massive energy gains while not affecting the detection rate of the IDS.
.
Chapter 5
Offering Resilience to an
Intrusion Detection System
through IDS Agent Placement
Optimisation
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter explores an approach of improving the placement strategy and the
resilience of an IDS through the deployment of the IDS agents using a placement
optimisation algorithm. Node failures can be commonplace in sensor networks.
Sensor nodes are constrained in power resources, therefore they are vulnerable to
frequent topology changes due to nodes failures. In the context of this research,
resilience refers to the ability of the network to recover its IDS architecture and
capabilities in order to avoid any loss of IDS agent that may affect the detection
rate.
In essence, there are two approaches for offering resilience in sensor network en-
vironments. One would be through IDS agent redundancy, i.e. to increase the
number of IDS agents so that this would be above the connectivity threshold.
However, this solution has a few drawbacks. First, the overheads will be con-
stantly higher, outweighing the benefits in the long term, particularly if the nodes
have a relatively low probability of failure. Second, there is no guarantee that the
detection rate will not drop as the placement strategy for the redundant nodes
will not be optimum in the first place.
Another strategy for injecting resiliency into the IDS would be to run a place-
ment protocol upon an IDS node failure. This chapter evaluates empirically this
approach, adopting an IDS placement strategy using the vertex-cover algorithm
described in 3.
Building upon the findings of Chapter 4, we present a new placement strategy
for the distributed model of the proposed IDS architecture. The aim is to find
a minimal cardinality of nodes that are able to efficiently detect attacks at the
networking layer, and also able to detect and mitigate the effect of node failures.
This Chapter presents the studies and experimental evaluation of the proposed
approach through simulation, following previous work that as described in Chapter
4. First, we evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed approach,
and then we evaluate its resilience against frequent topology changes due to node
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failures. Eventually, we discuss the experimental results and highlight the key
findings of the studies.
5.2 Vertex Cover in Graph Theory
Vertex cover algorithms have been applied on numerous real-world problems and
domains (electrical engineering, circuit design, network flow and so forth) as an
optimisation solution since the aim is to find a subset with minimal cardinality.
A vertex cover (node cover) in a graph is a subset of Vertices where every edge in
the graph is connected to at least one vertex in the cover. The goal of the vertex
cover is to find the smallest set of vertices that covers the whole graph with the
minimum number of nodes. Formally, a vertex cover V′ of a graph G = (V, E) is
a subset of V such that  ∈ E ⇒  ∈ V′ ∨  ∈ V′.
For instance, given a graph G = {1,2,3,4,5,6} as in Figure 3.3 and a set
of edges E = {{1,2},{1,3},{2,4},{3,4},{4,5},{4,6}}, obviously, the
union of E is equal to G. However, it is possible to cover all the vertices in G with
S = {1,4}, as shown in Figure 3.4 since vertex number 1 in touch with vertices
{2,3} and vertex number 4 is in touch with {2,3,5,6}.
5.3 The Proposed Placement IDS Architecture
We propose an optimising placement algorithm of IDS architecture consisting of
a central detection agent located in the base station and a distributed lightweight
intrusion detection agent deployed on a subset of the network nodes, as shown in
algorithm 2, based on vertex cover optimising algorithms. The central agent man-
ages the entire detection process and collects relevant data from the distributed
agents. Each network node that runs an instance of the distributed agent monitors
and collects data on local network activity from its 1-hop neighbouring nodes. This
implies that not all nodes need to run the IDS agent, but only a subset of them,
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such that every node in the network has at least one 1-hop neighbour running
the IDS agent. In graph-theoretical terms, such a subset of nodes are selected
to be IDS agents by vertex-cover greedy algorithm of the corresponding RGG
graph, capturing the structure of the network. This also implies that there exists
a minimum set of nodes that are able to efficiently monitor the network without
compromising the performance of the IDS with respect to proper placement of
IDS agent nodes. This set corresponds to the minimum or close to vertex cover
for the corresponding RGG graph.
In this optimising approach, we also consider that the random uniform placement
of the sensors inside the network area is abstracted by a RGG. RGG is formed
by n vertices that are placed uniformly at random in the [0,1]2 square. An
edge (,) exists iff the Euclidean distance of vertices  and  is at most r,
where r corresponds to the wireless communication radius r of the sensors. This
holds assuming a disc radio model; two sensors can communicate with each other
iff each one lies inside the communication range of the other. RGG have an
important property: unlike other random graphs, like Gn,p, the edges are not
statistically independent of each other. That is, the existence of an edge (,)
is not independent of the existence of edges (,) and (,). This property
makes RGG a realistic model for WSANs, as it captures to a great extent the
communication structure of real networks (at least their spatial aspects).
Algorithm 5 IDS Agent Placement
Require: N← the list of nodes
Require: S← the list of neighbour nodes
Require: A← IDS Agents
1: while N 6= ∅ do
2: Select a set of neighbours ∈ S that maximise S ∩ N
3: N← N − S
4: A← A ∪ S	
5: end while
6: return A
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5.4 The Proposed Resilient IDS
We consider the hybrid IDS architecture presented in Chapter 3, that consists of
a central detection agent located in the base station and a distributed lightweight
intrusion detection agent deployed on a subset of the network nodes. The central
IDS controls the entire IDS architecture and processes relevant data from the dis-
tributed agents. Each network node that runs an instance of the distributed agent
monitors and collects data on local network activity from its 1-hop neighbouring
nodes. This implies that not all nodes need to run the IDS agent, but only a subset
of them, such that every node in the network has at least one 1-hop neighbour
running the IDS agent. In graph theory, such a subset is defined as a vertex cover
of the corresponding RGG graph that captures the structure of the network. In
our Algorithm 6, the subset of nodes that function as IDS agents is selected based
on vertex-cover Algorithm (greedy algorithm) to find a subset with a minimum
cardinality with proper placement.
Moreover, we proposed a method to maintain and monitor the distributed IDS
agents against node failures. As shown in Algorithm 1, the central IDS frequently
checks the of IDS agents against node failure. the event that any IDS node fail
to communicate with the central IDS, the central IDS agent re-runs our proposed
algorithm to select a new subset (cover set that covers other nodes) of nodes to
act as IDS agents.
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Algorithm 6 Detect Sinkhole Attacks
Require: N← the list of nodes
Require: S←the list of neighbour nodes
Require: A← the list of selected Node to run as an IDS agent
Require: A′ ← A
1: while A = ∅ OR A 6= A′ do
2: while N 6= ∅ do
3: Select a set of neighbours ∈ S that maximise S ∩ N
4: N← N − S
5: A← A ∪ S	
6: A′ ← A
7: return A,A′
8: end while
9: end while
10: for Node in A do
11: for Node in S do
12: if (Node.Rank+IDSagentNodeRank
13: < Node.Parent.rank) then
14: Node.fault=Node.fault+1
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: for Node in N do
19: if Node.fault>Threshold then
20: Alarm
21: end if
22: end for
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5.5 Performance Evaluation
5.5.1 Simulation Setup
We ran our experiments in two parts. The first part was conducted to evaluate the
energy efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed approach. The second part of
our experiments was run to study the resilience and redundancy of our approach.
For both experiments, we use the Cooja Osterlind et al. (2006) emulator, which
provides a detailed cross-layer simulation for WSNs running the 6LoWPAN stack.
We consider three qualitatively distinct network densities, as they are indicated by
the RGG model. Specifically, we consider a network area A = [0,100]2, where
n sensor motes are deployed uniformly at random, for n ∈ {32,64,128}. We
get three network setups in which r is (a) almost equal to (b) ×1.5 and (c)×2
the connectivity threshold, thus resulting in (a) sparse, (b) normal and (c) dense
networks (see Appendix ??).
For each network density, we consider Algorithm 1 in which the nodes acting as
IDS agents are selected based on the cover set algorithm, namely, the greedy al-
gorithm. With each case, we set 10% of the node population to act as malicious
nodes deploying sinkhole attacks by exploiting the rank mechanism of RPL. Any
remaining nodes are regular nodes. Furthermore, in the second part of our ex-
periment we gradually drop off some nodes that perform IDS agent during the
simulation to evaluate the resilience of the proposed approach.
For each network configuration, we also run a scenario with no nodes operating as
IDS nodes. For each scenario, we create 10 random instances of the network. This
allows us to effectively mitigate any issues in our simulations due to the random
network topology (in other words, we sample the space of RGG instances). For
each instance, we run 10 iterations simulating the network operation for a simula-
tion time of 3600 seconds where nodes generate and transmit data approximately
every second. For each scenario and each performance metric, we compute average
values and 95% confidence intervals.
Offering Resilience to an IDS through IDS Agent Placement Optimisation 110
5.5.2 Evaluation Metrics
In the following subsections, we define the metrics that are used to evaluate our
proposed IDS architecture.
5.5.2.1 Detection Rate
We define the detection rate as the number of true positive detections of malicious
nodes over the total number of malicious nodes in the network.
Detection rate =
number of true positive detections
total number of malicious nodes
(5.1)
5.5.2.2 Communication Overheads
We define the communication overhead as the additional volume of data commu-
nication introduced in the network as a result of the operation of the IDS. We
follow the practise of Raza et al. (2013) and monitor this metric only to the 1-hop
neighbouring nodes of the Sink (the rationale is that any network traffic will have
to go through these nodes prior to reaching the Sink). We denote by EIDS the
energy consumption of the nodes with the IDS running and with EIDS the energy
consumption of the nodes with no IDS running in the network. Then,
Communication overhead =
EIDS − EIDS
EIDS
(5.2)
5.5.2.3 Total Energy Consumption in the Network
We measure the total energy consumption ΔEtot in the network as the difference
between the total available energy in the network at the beginning of a simulation
and at the end. We denote initial available energy for sensor  by E
init
and the
initial available energy for sensor  by E
final
. Then,
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ΔEtot = ∈n(Einit − Efinal) (5.3)
5.5.3 Simulation Findings
5.5.3.1 Results of Sparse Networks
Figure 5.1: IDS detection rate of sparse network
Figure 5.1 shows that the average detection rate in sparse networks in which the
subset of the node population functioning as IDS agents selected by our approach
remains high, around 80%. Furthermore, the detection rate with random place-
ment of distributed IDS agents based on the connectivity threshold remains as
high as 85%. However, in very rare cases areas of the network remain unmoni-
tored because of the random placement of IDS agents.
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Figure 5.2: Energy consumption and communication overhead of sparse net-
works
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show that the energy consumption and the communication
overhead introduced to the network by the IDS on a sparse networks is proportional
to the number of nodes operating as IDS agents. This shows that our approach
achieved lower communication overheads and energy consumption rate when com-
pared with random placement based on the connectivity threshold, where a con-
stant number of nodes function as IDS agents. As shown in Figure 5.1 our approach
achieved a high detection rate with lower energy consumption and communication
overheads.
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Figure 5.3: Energy consumption and communication overhead introduced by
the IDS of sparse networks
5.5.3.2 Results of Moderate Dense Networks
Figure 5.4: IDS detection rate of moderate dense network
The IDS placement method based on the cover-set algorithm also achieves a high
detection rate in moderate dense networks, as shown in Figure 5.4, it remains high
around 80%. Further, the detection rate with random placement of distributed
IDS agents based on connectivity threshold is around 85%. In very rare cases,
areas of the network remain unmonitored because of the random placement of
IDS agents.
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Figure 5.5: Energy consumption and communication overhead of moderate
dense networks
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the energy consumption and the communication over-
heads introduced to the network by the IDS of moderate dense networks. The
communication overheads and energy consumption in random IDS agent place-
ment scenarios are higher than Cover Set algorithm placement due to random
placement allows more nodes to function as IDS agents. This demonstrates that
the placement of distributed IDS agents using cover Set algorithm allows fewer
nodes with proper placement to function as IDS agents.
Figure 5.6: Energy consumption and communication overhead introduced by
the IDS of moderate dense networks
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5.5.3.3 Results of Dense Networks
Figure 5.7: IDS detection rate of dense network
Figure 5.7 shows the average detection rate of dense networks. The detection
rate in both placement strategies, random placement of distributed IDS agents
based on connectivity threshold and the placement of IDS agents based on cover
set algorithm, remains high at around 85%. Nevertheless, as with other network
densities, there are cases in which areas of the network remain unmonitored be-
cause the random placement of IDS agents does not always result in complete or
adequate coverage of the network area. This demonstrates that our approach pro-
vides better placement of the distributed IDS architecture since it allows a subset
of nodes with proper location to perform as IDS agents.
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Figure 5.8: Energy consumption and communication overhead of dense net-
works
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show the energy consumption and the communication over-
heads introduced to the network by the IDS of dense networks. The communica-
tion overhead and energy consumption in random IDS agent placement scenarios
are also higher than with placement based on the cover set algorithm.
Figure 5.9: Energy consumption and communication overhead introduced by
the IDS of dense networks
For all network densities, the energy consumption and the communication over-
head introduced to the network by the IDS is proportional to the number of nodes
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operating as IDS agents. This shows that our approach achieved a lower commu-
nication overhead and energy consumption rate compared with random placement
based on the connectivity threshold, where a constant number of nodes function
as IDS agents. Moreover, our approach achieved a high detection rate with lower
energy consumption, indicating that a minimal number of nodes with proper place-
ment were allowed to function as IDS agents.
5.5.4 Simulation Findings of Resilience Study
The series of the following experiments study the resilience of the proposed ap-
proach that refers to the ability of the network to recover its IDS architecture and
capabilities in order to avoid any loss of IDS agent. We gradually and arbitrar-
ily dropped some IDS agent nodes during the simulation to study the resilience
and effect on the efficiency of the IDS. For each network density, we adopted five
different scenarios. In the first scenario, all IDS agents were selected by cover
set algorithm, and then we dropped one additional IDS agent in each subsequent
scenario as shown in Figures 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12.
Figure 5.10: Detection rate over IDS agent node failure of sparse networks
Figure 5.10 shows the detection of sparse networks. The average detection rate
in the scenario with all IDS agents is around 85%. However, the detection rate
quickly drops in the other scenarios in which the IDS agents are gradually dropped.
Offering Resilience to an IDS through IDS Agent Placement Optimisation 118
The reason for the lower detection rate is that there were networks that were
unmonitored when the IDS agents were dropped.
Figure 5.11: Detection rate over IDS agent node failure of moderate dense
networks
In moderate dense networks, the average detection rate also quickly drops as the
number of IDS agents is reduced as shown in Figure 5.11. The reason for the lower
detection rate is that there also were networks that were unmonitored when the
IDS agents were dropped.
Figure 5.12: Detection rate over IDS agent node failure of dense networks
Figure 5.12 shows the detection of dense networks. The average detection rate
with the scenario where with all IDS agents is around 85%. Further, the detection
rate quickly drops as the number of IDS agents is reduced.
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Then, we evaluated the proposed algorithm (IDS agent placement based on cover
set algorithm). The algorithm underpins an invocation of a process that monitors
the health of IDS agents, to detect when a node failure occurs. The centralised
IDS reallocates a new subset (new cover set) of nodes to function as IDS agents in
the event that an IDS agent node was dropped. In order to study the effectiveness
of our Algorithm, we dropped off some IDS agent nodes gradually and arbitrarily
during the simulation and analysed the detection rate after the simulation.
Figure 5.13: Detection rate after IDS agents failed recovery of sparse networks
Figure 5.13 shows the detection rate of sparse networks. The detection rate of
scenarios in which some IDS agent nodes were dropped gradually remains as high
as 85% compared to the scenario in which no IDS agent was dropped.
Figure 5.14: Detection rate after IDS agents failed recovery of moderate net-
works
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In moderate dense networks, the detection rate in scenarios in which some IDS
agent nodes were dropped gradually also remained high, as shown in Figure 5.14.
Figure 5.15: Detection rate after after failed IDS agent recovery of dense
networks
Figure 5.15 shows that the detection rate of the dense network remained high even
after the nodes were dropped. The detection rate in scenarios in which some IDS
agent nodes were dropped gradually remained high (around 80%), compared to
the scenario in which no IDS agent was dropped. This indicates that our approach
provides a level of resilience against node failures.
Figure 5.16: Energy consumption and communication overhead introduced
by the IDS with the recovery mechanism of sparse networks
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Figure 5.16 shows the energy consumption and the communication overheads in
sparse networks. The energy and communication overheads are slightly increased
in scenarios in which IDS agent nodes were dropped. This is because the cen-
tralised IDS reallocates the distributed IDS agents to recover any area left un-
monitored.
Figure 5.17: Energy consumption and communication overhead introduced
by the IDS with the recovery mechanism of moderate dense networks
Figures 5.17 and 5.18 show the energy consumption and the communication over-
heads of moderately dense and dense networks. The energy consumption also
increased slightly due to distributed IDS agent reallocation.
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Figure 5.18: Energy consumption and communication overhead introduced
by the IDS with recovery mechanism of dense networks
For all network densities, the energy consumption and the communication over-
heads were introduced to the network by the proposed algorithm, which monitors
the distributed IDS agents against node failure. The energy consumption increased
slightly after random IDS agent nodes were dropped because the centralised IDS
reallocated the distributed IDS agents to recover the area that left unmonitored.
This small increase is acceptable, and the effort results in increased resilience of
the distributed IDS architecture against node failure.
This indicates that the energy efficiency and resilience of the hybrid IDS archi-
tecture for ad-hoc networks is independent of the number of nodes acting as IDS
agents and their placement. It suffices that only one of the neighbouring nodes
monitors and reports relevant information to the Sink. Thus, it reduces the num-
ber of nodes that must operate as IDS agents.
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Approach Overheads Scalability Resilience Comments
SVELETE high small WSNs - high communication overhead
CT depends on the density larger networks limited achieved lower Energy Consumption and communication overhead
CS depends on the density larger networks resilient achieved lower communication overhead and resilient against node failures
Table 5.1: Comparison of proposed approaches with relevant approach
Table 5.1 provides a brief comparison of proposed approaches of this thesis with the
relevant approach in the published literature and highlights the main contributions
of this thesis. As shown in the table, proposed approaches allow to archived the
aims of this thesis. The proposed approach that is described in Chapter 4 has
achieved lower communication overhead and energy consumption since it allows
a only a a random subset of the nodes based on connectivity threshold of RGG
to act as IDS agents instead of all nodes as in SVELTE by (Raza et al. 2013).
This greatly reduces the number of nodes that need to operate as IDS agents, thus
mitigating any scalability and performance issues. And also, this is the reason why
other works in the literature on IoT and WSAN IDS limit their simulation studies
in networks with small populations. Moreover, the approach described in Chapter
5 achieved lower communication overhead and energy consumption because of use
of cover-set algorithm that allows a subset on nodes to perform the IDS agent
with minimum cardinality. Furthermore, this approach study the resilience that
refers to the ability of the network to recover its IDS architecture and capabilities
in order to avoid any loss of IDS agent that may affect the detection rate.
5.6 Conclusion
In this research, we used vertex-cover theory to minimise the number of IDS
agents with respect to node placement. Thus, we can have a lower number of
IDS agents which helps to improve the communication overheads and energy dis-
sipation. Compared to the random placement of IDS agents introduced in Chapter
3 based on connectivity threshold in RGG, vertex-cover algorithm results in lower
communication overheads and energy consumption Chein and Mugnier (2008).
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This work studies an efficient and lightweight IDS for ad-hoc networks through
the lens of IPv6-enabled WASNs. We first use RGG that which makes it possible
to construct a formal model of WSNs. RGG capture the spatial characteristics of
WSNs such as inter-dependencies on the existence of wireless links among neigh-
bouring nodes. We focus on network attacks in IoT-specific networking protocols,
such as sinkhole attacks in RPL. We identify the underlying causes of communica-
tion overheads and attempt to optimise the trade-off between the energy efficiency
and detection rate of the IDS. We propose a novel IDS architecture that requires
only a subset of the nodes with proper placement to efficiently operate as dis-
tributed IDS agents.
The experimental results show that our proposed approach achieved a high de-
tection rate with a subset (cover set) of the nodes functioning as IDS agents.
Therefore, the energy consumption and communication overhead introduced by
the IDS is reduced since the energy consumption is proportional to the number
of IDS agents. Furthermore, the results show that our proposed IDS architec-
ture is resilient and robust against node failure. The centralised IDS monitors
the distributed IDS agents and reallocates a new subset to function as IDS agents
whenever node failure accrues.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
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6.1 Introduction
This chapter summarises the results and the important findings of this thesis, and
reviews this thesis with critical analyses to determine how this research address
the aforementioned research question in Chapter 1, followed by recommendations
and future directions for extending the research carried out in this thesis.
6.2 Achievement of Objectives
The objectives of this thesis were:
• O1: to review the current state-of-the-art-IDS with a particular emphasis on
using IDS in WSN.
• O2: to define new evaluation metrics for WSN-IDS efficiency. In particular,
define the metrics that capture the trade-off between energy consumption
/communication overhead with detection rate of events.
• O3: to define a new WSN- IDS model/ architecture that properly addresses the
distributed nature of WSN.
• O4 to develop efficient protocols/methods/algorithms for WSN-IDS based on
objectives 2, 3.
• O5: to develop a proof-of-concept WSN-IDS testbed for experimentally evalu-
ating objective 4.
Overall the objectives were fully met. Following a thorough review of the current
state of the art (O1), it was established that many IDS algorithms that are effi-
cient in conventional networks, cannot be practically deployed in sensor networks
as they may impede the actual operations and purpose of the network. Acknowl-
edging that WSNs have a number of characteristics and constraints, we focus on
establishing metrics to measure the efficiency of the IDS in such networks. These
Conclusion 127
metrics were primarily linked to energy and computational efficiency, as well as
the communication overheads (O2). There were cases in fact where a generous
deployment of an IDS over a number of WSN agents (motes) resulted into the net-
work being non operational. This lead to researching and proposing architectures
that will implement a hybrid IDS model capable of balancing the IDS detection
performance (or the IDS’ indigenous upper bound of detection rate) and resulting
energy and communication overheads (O3). The research resulted into two main
architectures - one offering effective energy trade-offs and another one offering re-
silience - following a rigorous and formal analysis using RGGs (O3 & O4). Finally
the above architectures were empirically evaluated through a series of simulations
(O5).
6.3 Evaluation
6.3.1 Literature
The systematic literature review involved the investigation of scientific published
work in the area of IDS, IoT networks and WSNs in particular, found in online
digital repositories. The online resources provided an extensive source of relevant
information on the current state of research and body of knowledge. The litera-
ture study was instrumental for developing the specific conceptual and theoretical
framework. The current state-of-the-art Intrusion Detection System in Wireless
Sensor Networks was presented. Furthermore, the security aspects and challenges
of wireless sensor networks, networking standard protocols and shortcoming/lim-
itations of the related work in the fields of Intrusion Detection in WSNs were
explored and investigated.
More specifically, the literature review process commenced with the research in the
domain of Wireless Sensor Networks and specifically to understand the character-
istics of tiny devices and their security challenges. Then, we reviewed standardised
wireless network protocols, their security weakness and how these can potentially,
Conclusion 128
or have been exploited by malicious activities. Lastly, we reviewed the current
state-of-the-art IDSs in WSN and IoT to identify and map the shortcomings into
research questions that guided this research.
6.3.2 Analysis
In the domain of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) in IoT, a considerable amount
of research has been carried out on deployment architectures, detection strategies
and algorithms. However, available IDS in IoT are designed based on assump-
tions holding from “conventional” computer networks, e.g. that each node of the
network is assumed to be powerful in terms of resources (available energy, mem-
ory, CPU, etc.). They are also assumed to be always available and the nodes to
communicate over a reliable and high-capacity network, which is not the case for
WSN environments. As such, an IDS that efficiently addresses the IoT paradigm
is needed.
The current state-of-the-art on IDSs for WSN and IoT networks are persistent in
proposing resource-intensive solutions, as they have been inheriting solutions from
conventional computer networks. Centralised IDS architectures introduce signifi-
cant communication overhead to the network as the base station (or Sink) due to
large numbers of requests to and from the nodes related to IDS data collection.
Distributed IDS architectures rely on the cooperation between the sensor nodes,
thus increasing the communication load as well as energy dissipation. Lastly, hy-
brid IDS architectures achieve a better control and global overview of the network,
but currently available solutions also introduce a significant communication over-
head that increases proportionally to the number of network nodes. Furthermore,
resilience and robustness in such environments have not been extensively studied.
The shortcomings and open issues of the current state-of-the-art in related work
contributing to designing proposed IDS for WSN can be summarised as follows:
1. Existing IDS in WSNs and IoT remain relatively resource-intensive and the
constrained nature of WSNs and IoT have not been fully explored.
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2. The IDS placement strategy in the current state of the art, is based on
assumptions inherited from conventional computer networks; as such a more
suitable IDS placement strategy that addresses the nature of WSNs and IoT
is needed.
3. Robustness of the current state-of-the-art IDS in WSNs and IoT has not yet
been fully investigated.
In this work we focus on hybrid IDS architectures but we show that by taking the
specifics of IoT protocols into account, such as the ranking mechanism of RPL, as
well as the spatial characteristics of such networks, the number of required IDS
agents in the network (and therefore the corresponding overhead) can be greatly
reduced while maintaining sufficiently high detection rates.
6.3.3 Design
The identified shortcomings and open issues in current state of research were
translated into research questions that in turn specified the aim and objectives of
this research. The aims of this thesis were derived from a conducted literature
study to fulfill the shortcomings of the current state-of-the-art IDS in WSNs and
to address the constraint and distributed nature of WSN.
This thesis introduces an IDS architecture that efficiently addresses the particular
characteristics of the IoT and Wireless Sensor Network paradigms. In particu-
lar, the proposed system addresses the following characteristics of IoT and WSN:
their highly distributed nature; their ad-hoc network structure; the peer-to-peer
communication scheme among the devices; the highly constrained nature of the
devices per se in terms of resources (computational power, available energy, limited
memory, etc).
First, we determine the impact of IDS mechanisms towards the communication
and energy overheads and attempt to model the trade-off between energy effi-
ciency of IDS and detection rate. Then, we propose a novel IDS architecture that
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requires only a subset of the nodes with proper placement to efficiently operate
distributed IDS agents. We model a WSN with the use of Random Geometric
Graphs (RGG). Random Graphs have been used as a well-studied model and a
paradigm for wireless networks, such as sensor networks. Motes are represented
a vertices in RGG, and the communication between these motes is represented
by the edges. The RGG model efficiently captures spatial characteristics of the
network that are closely related to network connectivity; e.g. inter-dependencies
on the existence of wireless links among neighbouring nodes. Random Geometric
Graphs can represent the actual placing of the set of n vertices uniformly and
randomly at a given area of interest. Then, motivated by how IoT networking
protocols, such as RPL, manage and operate the network, we identify the trade-
offs between the communication overheads introduced by an IDS and its detection
rate of attacks such as the sinkhole attack. The central IDS controls the entire
IDS architecture and relevant data from the distributed agents. Each network
node that runs an instance of the distributed agent, monitors and collects data on
local network activity from its 1-hop neighbouring nodes. This implies that not all
nodes need to run the IDS agent, but only a subset of them such that every node in
the network has at least one 1-hop neighbour operating as an IDS agent. In graph
theory, such a subset is defined as a vertex cover of the corresponding RGG graph
that captures the structure of the network. This subset of the nodes that act as
IDS agents is selected based on the Vertex-cover algorithm (greedy algorithm) to
find a subset of minimum cardinality with proper placement. Moreover, we pro-
pose a method to maintain and monitor the distributed IDS agents against node
failures. Our designed system successfully addresses the following characteristics
of IoT and WSN: their highly distributed nature; their ad-hoc network structure;
the peer-to-peer communication scheme among the devices; the highly constrained
nature of the devices per se in terms of resources(computational power, available
energy, limited memory, etc).
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6.3.4 Prototype
A prototype was implemented by extending the state-of-the-art IDS for WSN by
Raza et al. called SVELTE Raza et al. (2013). In SVELTE, authors consider
multi-hop peer-to-peer IPv6-enabled WSNs running the 6LoWPAN stack Shelby
and Bormann (2011) on ContikiOS Dunkels et al. (2004). They develop a hy-
brid IDS architecture that consists of a centralised module running on the Sink
and a distributed agent running on each individual sensor node. We applied our
methods on the state of the art on IDS for WSNs and conduct our performance
evaluation via extensive emulations. We focus on experimentally evaluating our
approach on SVELTE as a representative example of hybrid architecture IDS for
ad-hoc networks. Particularly, we evaluate the trade-off between the potentially
reduced overhead of the IDS in successfully detection rate (due to lower number
of active IDS agents in the network) versus the reduced communication overhead
and increased energy efficiency of the network. We also evaluate the reliance and
robustness of our proposed method against random node failures.
6.4 Experimental Results & Findings
We consider various network densities as they are formally defined by RGG model.
Experimental results show that our proposed approach achieved high detection
rates with a subset of the nodes running as IDS agents. The energy consumption
and communication overhead introduced by the IDS reduced since the energy
consumption is proportional to the number of IDS agents.
We show that 1) indeed the IDS detection rates remain at very high levels (around
85%) even with a subset of the nodes as IDS agents; 2) that the required number
of IDS agents in the network in order to achieve these levels is independent from
the network population and in fact constant ; 3) that the energy consumption and
communication overhead introduced by the IDS is proportional to the number
of IDS agents, therefore our method allows for massive energy gains while not
affecting the detection rate of the IDS.
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Conducted experiments show that in all network densities the average detection
rate where the subset of the node population operates as an IDS agent selected by
our approach that uses cover set (greedy algorithm) remains high (around 80%).
Also, the detection rate in random placement of distributed IDS agents based on
connectivity threshold remains at high levels. However in rare cases, areas of the
network remain unmonitored due to the random placement of IDS agents. This
demonstrates that our approach provides better placement of the distributed IDS
architecture since it allows the proper nodes to perform the IDS agent.
Moreover we show that the energy consumption and the communication overhead
introduced to the network by the IDS is proportional to the number of nodes oper-
ating as IDS agents. This shows that our approach achieved lower communication
overhead and energy consumption rate compared to random placement based on
the connectivity threshold where a constant number of nodes performing the IDS
agent. Our approach achieved high detection rate with lower energy consumption
which reveals that minimal number of nodes were allowed to run the IDS agent.
At the second part of our experiment we first dropped off gradually and arbitrarily
some IDS agent nodes during the simulation to study the resilience and efficiency
of the proposed approach. The rsults show that the detection rate quickly drops
due to that areas of the networks when nodes were drooped off left un-monitored.
Then, we evaluated our algorithm that integrated with our approach that monitors
the health of IDS agents. We also dropped off gradually and arbitrary some IDS
agent nodes during the simulation. The detection rate remains high even after
the nodes dropping which indicates that our approach provides a level of resilience
against nodes failure.
Furthermore, results show that our proposed IDS architecture is resilient and
robust against node failures. Centralised IDS monitors the distributed IDS agents
and reallocates a new subset to run as IDS agents whenever node failure accrue.
For all network densities the energy consumption and the communication overhead
introduced to the network by our proposed algorithm that monitors the distributed
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IDS agents against nodes failure. The energy consumption slightly increased af-
ter random IDS agents nodes dropped due to the fact that the centralised IDS
reallocated the distributed IDS agents in order to recover the area that was left
un-monitored. We argue that the effort that provides the resilience of distributed
IDS architecture against node failures is worthwhile.
Experimental results show that the proposed approach achieved high detection
rates with a subset of the nodes running as IDS agents. The energy consump-
tion and communication overheads introduced by the IDS were reduced since the
energy consumption is proportional to the number of IDS agents. Furthermore, re-
sults show that the proposed IDS architecture is resilient and robust against node
failures. Centralised IDS monitors the distributed IDS agents and reallocates a
new subset to run as IDS agents whenever node failure accrue.
This indicates that the energy efficiency and resilience of hybrid IDS architecture
for ad-hoc networks is independent to the number of nodes acting as IDS agents
and their placement. It is sufficient to set only one of neighbouring nodes to
monitor and report relevant information to the Sink. Thus, the number of nodes
that are needed to operate as IDS agents is effectively reduced.
6.5 Future Work and Recommendations
In this section, we propose three possible directions and extensions for future
research. These recommendations are set out in the order of importance with the
most important being presented first.
In this work detection accuracy was outside the scope of the research. We investi-
gate the underline cause of the communication and energy consumption overheads
introduced to constrained networks by Intrusion Detection System. In particu-
lar, we consider the underline cause of communication overhead in state-of-the-art
and optimise the trade-off between energy efficiency of IDS and detection rate. We
consider the IDS architecture and the IDS agents’ placement strategies regardless
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of the detection accuracy. we propose a novel IDS architecture that requires only
a subset of the nodes with proper placement to efficiently operate distributed IDS
agents. Further studies should be conducted to enhance the accuracy of detection
algorithms that we used with proposed IDS architecture. For instance, we consider
in conducted experiments for this research sinkhole attack on RPL routing proto-
col for constrained networks as an attacker model. Sinkhole attack is an insider
attack were an attacker compromises a node inside the network and launches an
attack. The malicious node in this attack advertises a beneficial path in order to
attract its neighbour nodes to route the traffic through it based on the routing
metric that used in routing protocol. The existing detection algorithm we used on
proposed IDS architecture achieved high detection rates. However, further work
is certainly required to improve the detection accuracy of this detection algorithm
and also an extension is required to detect other attacks on other routing protocol.
This thesis considers ad-hoc networks excluding the mobility of wireless networks.
In the proposed approach, we consider the static positioning of ad-hoc Wireless
Sensor Networks. We provide a formal model for WSNs with the use of Random
Geometric Graphs; a graph-theoretical model that properly captures the spatial
characteristics of WSNs such as inter-dependencies on the existence of wireless
links among neighbouring nodes. Future studies should carried out to investigate
the novel findings of this work on Mobile Wireless Sensor Networks (MWSNs)
that are been used recently in many critical setting and real-world applications.
MWSNs share the following characteristics of IoT and WSN: their highly dis-
tributed nature; their ad-hoc network structure; the peer-to-peer communication
scheme among the devices; the highly constrained nature of the devices per se in
terms of resources (computational power, available energy, limited memory, etc).
Moreover, MWSNs are characterised by their mobility feature that adds more chal-
lenging security solutions for sensor networks. Therefore, future research should be
considering a study of standardised routing protocols of mobile Wireless Networks
and investigate the aforementioned challenges. The future research should be car-
ried out to extend the proposed IDS WSNs to include the mobility of WSNs. The
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IDS architecture for WSNs proposed on this thesis can be extended to consider
mobile Wireless Networks.
Furthermore, future reserach activities can focus on employing rigorous graph-
theoretical methods and tools to formally prove the proposed approach on real-
world networks. Moreover, more efficient and specific algorithms for choosing in
a distributed way which nodes should operate as IDS agents as well as balancing
this role among all the nodes can be researched and developed.
6.6 Conclusion
This research overall has successfully achieved its aims and objectives, providing a
novel Intrusion Detection System architecture for ad-hoc networks that properly
addresses the distributed nature of constrained wireless networks.
In this thesis, we studies efficient and lightweight Intrusion Detection Systems for
ad-hoc networks via the prism of IPv6-enabled Wireless Actuator Sensor Networks.
We first used Random Geometric Graphs (RGG) that make it possible to provide a
formal model of WSNs. RGGs capture the spatial characteristics of WSNs as such
inter-dependencies on the existence of wireless links among neighbouring nodes.
We focus on network attacks in IoT-specific networking protocols such as sinkhole
attacks in RPL. We identify the underline cause of communication overhead in
state-of-the-art and try to optimise the trade-off between the energy efficiency of
IDS and detection rate. We propose a novel IDS architecture that requires only a
subset of the nodes with proper placement to efficiently operate distributed IDS
agents.
The proposed methods were integrated on the state-of-the-art IDS for WSNs and
we conducted our performance evaluation through extensive emulations. Experi-
ment results show that the proposed approach achieved high detection rates with
a subset of the nodes running as IDS agents. The energy consumption and com-
munication overhead introduced by the IDS reduced since the energy consumption
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is proportional to the number of IDS agents. Various network densities we con-
sidered (as these are formally defined via the RGG model) and it was shown that
indeed the IDS detection rates remain at very high levels even with a subset of
the nodes as IDS agents.
The experimental results show the energy consumption and communication over-
heads introduced by the IDS is proportional to the number of IDS agents. There-
fore, the proposed method allows for massive energy gains while not affecting the
detection rate of the IDS. Furthermore, results show that our proposed IDS archi-
tecture is resilient and robust against node failures. Because the centralised IDS
monitors the distributed IDS agents and reallocates a new subset to run as IDS
agents whenever node failure accrues.
Appendix A
A selection of indicative network
topology alternatives
The following figures depict the configurations used with varying density of nodes
and IDS agents that were used for the empirical evaluation of the proposed meth-
ods.
A.1 Sparse Network
Figure A.1: 20% IDS agents
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Figure A.2: 60% IDS agents
Figure A.3: 100% IDS agents
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A.2 Moderate Dense Networks
Figure A.4: 20% IDS agents
Figure A.5: 60% IDS agents
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Figure A.6: 100% IDS agents
A.3 Dense Networks
Figure A.7: 20% IDS agents
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Figure A.8: 60% IDS agents
Figure A.9: 100% IDS agents

Appendix B
Energy Consumption Calculations
B.1 Sensor Node Energy Consumption
Figure B.1: The basic components of motes
We calculated the energy consumption of WSN nodes as follows:
• Sensing Unit. Eon−oƒ ƒ is the energy consumption of the closing sensor oper-
ation, Eoƒ ƒ−on is the energy consumption of the opening sensor operation
and Esensor−rn is the energy consumption of the sensing operation.
Esen = Eon−oƒ ƒ + Eoƒ ƒ−on + Esensor−rn (B.1)
• Processing Unit. In this unit, there are three operation states (sleep, idle,
run). Ecp is the sum of the state energy consumption Ecp−stte and the
143
Appendices 144
state-transition energy consumption, Ecp−chnge where  = 1,2, ..m is
the processor operation state and m is the number of the processor state,
j = 1,2, ..n, is the is the type of state transition and n is the number of the
state-transition.
Ecp = Ecp−stte + Ecp−chnge
=
m∑
=1
Pcp−stt()Tcp−stte() +
n∑
=1
Pcp−stt(j)Tcp−stte(j)
(B.2)
Pcp−stte() is the power of state  that can be found from the reference
manual and Tcp−stte() is the time interval in state . Pcp−chnge(j)
is the frequency of state transition j and Tcp−chnge(j) is the energy con-
sumption of one-time state transition j (Tomic´ and McCann 2017).
• Communication Unit. The transceiver operation states: T, R,Oƒ ƒ , de,
Seep nd Cer Chne Assessment (CCA/ED) (Zhou et al. 2011).
We calculate the total energy consumption of the communication unit by
summing the state energy consumption and state-transition.
Ecom = ETX + ERX + Ede + Eseep + ECCA (B.3)
Then, The total energy consumption all over the network =
Etot = Esen + Ecp + Ecom (B.4)
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B.2 Energy Consumption Calculations in Con-
tiki OS
B.2.1 Tmote Sky energy consumption calculation
For all conducted experiments, we use Tmote Sky as it has been used widely in real-
wold systems. Thus, we followed the operation conditions of Tmote Sky provided
by the manufacturer to trace and calculate the energy consumption during the
simulations.
Figure B.2: Tmote Sky operation conditions (TmoteSky data sheet)
Etot = Esen×0.0545mA+Ecp×1.8mA+Etrnsmt×19.5mA+sten×21.8mA (B.5)
E(mJ) =
Etot × 3V
4396 × 8 (B.6)
P(mW) =
Emj
Tme(s)
(B.7)
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B.2.2 Power-trace of Cooja simulation
import csv
import pandas as pd
import numpy as np
filename=’motes output’
data=np.array([’s’,’clock_time’,’P’,’rimeaddr_node_addr’,’seqno’,’all_cpu’,’all_lpm’,’all_transmit’,’all_listen’,’all_idle_transmit’,’all_idle_listen’,’cpu’,’lpm’,’transmit’,’listen’,’idle_transmit’, ’idle_listen’])
with open(filename,’rb’) as f:
reader = csv.reader(f,delimiter=’ ’)
for row in reader:
if len(row)==17:
data=np.vstack([data,row])
d=pd.DataFrame(data=data[1:,1:],index=data[1:,0],columns=data[0,1:])
for c in d.columns:
if c!=’P’:
d[c]=d[c].map(float)
#extract ID and store in new colunn
def get_id():
return [int(s.split("ID:")[1].strip()) for s in d.index]
d[’ID’]=get_id()
# start producing output...
print "primary data extracted (interval read):"
for i in d.ID.unique():
if len(d[d.ID==i])>1:
(cpu,lpm,tx,tr)=d[d.ID==i].iloc[0][’all_cpu’:’all_listen’]
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print "node",i,cpu,lpm,tx,tr
print "\n\nCommunication overhead (0 to 30 mins):"
for i in d.ID.unique():
if len(d[d.ID==i])>2:
(cpu,lpm,tx,tr)=d[d.ID==i].iloc[1][’all_cpu’:’all_listen’]
(cpu1,lpm1,tx1,tr1)=d[d.ID==i].iloc[2][’all_cpu’:’all_listen’]
comm_over=(((tx1-tx)*19.5+(tr1-tr)*21.8)*3/(4096*8))/1800
communication_overhead30[i]=comm_over
print "node",i,comm_over
print "Total communication overhead for all nodes:",
np.sum(communication_overhead30.values())
print "\nTotal commnunication overhead for 30 mins
(using the calculation):", np.sum(communication_overhead.values())
#d.all_energy.plot()
#d.all_energy.hist
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